Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/893

857 RECENT CASES 857 held in regard to a limited maximum fee, because it regulated a harmless busi- ness. Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924. Cf. City of Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 Pac. 755. The principal case, however, recognizes the inci- dental evil of the business, exorbitant rates charged to the necessitous, but holds that laborers need protection while clerical and technical appUcants do not. Accordingly the court, in order to render the ordinance constitutional, construes "wages" to include only the former. Grenada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261; Chesebrough v. City &° County of San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 96 Pac. 288. The term "wages" has received various constructions. See Bovard v. K. C, Ft. S. &- M. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. App. 498, 501; /« re Stryker, 158 N. Y. 526, 528, 53 N. E. 525; South b" North Alabama Railway v. Falkner, 49 Ala. 115, 118. But each case should depend on its own subject matter and object. Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. D. 45, 46. And it is submitted that the ordinance in the principal case applies to all and is constitutional. It is, and was intended as, a regulation similar to usury laws to protect the necessitous, regardless of their employment. It seems that "wages and board" was used merely to afford a basis for computing the fee chargeable. See, dissenting opinions. Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 242, 77 Pac. 324, ^27; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597. Constitutional Law — Powers of Legislature: Taxation — Police Power — Encroachment Thereon. — Section 2 of the Harrison Anti-Nar- cotic Act provides certain regulations and restrictions governing the sale, dispensing and distribution of opium and its derivatives. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the provisions unconstitutional as an invasion of the police power reserved to the states. On error to the Supreme Court, held, that the provisions were valid. United States v. Doremus, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1918, No. 367. For a discussion of this case, see Notes, page 846. Contempt of Court — Constructive Contempt — Public Assault on Alleged Informer. — The defendant, in violation of an injunction, removed liquor from his saloon. Pending an application against him to punish for con- tempt, the defendant publicly but outside the presence of the court assaulted and battered a person supposed by him to have given the information as to removal of the liquor. In fact, the defendant was mistaken in the identity of his victim. Held, that the defendant is guilty of contempt of court. In re Hand, 105 Atl. 594 (N.J.). In general, any conduct which obstructs the due administration of justice constitutes contempt of court. See Adams v. Gardner, 176 Ky. 252, 257, 195 S. W. 412, 414; Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 145, 106 S. W. 990, 996; Oswald, Contempt of Court, 3 ed., 6. Thus it is contempt to procure one already subpoenaed as a witness to absent himself from the trial. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 80 Mass. 87. See State v. Moore, 146 N. C. 653, 61 S. E. 463; 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, 8 ed., § 258. Nor would the fact that the subpoena had not yet been served make such acts any less an obstruction of justice. Rex V. Carroll (1913), Vict. L. R. 380. See 2 Wharton, Criminal Law, 7 ed., § 2287; 27 Harv. L. Rev. 166. Even the use of threatening language toward an intended witness for the purpose of intimidating him in giving his evidence is a contempt of court. Shaw v. Shaw, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 141. See Rex v. Ch-ay, 23 N. Z. L. R. 52 C. A. A fortiori an assault and battery upon a witness to influence his testimony in a future trial constitutes a contempt. Brannan v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 350, 172 S. W. 703. See 32 Harv. L. Rev. 174. The principal case, in holding as a contempt an act of this nature done outside the presence of the court, the battery being committed upon one who is not a witness, goes beyond the prevailing authorities. The policy of the law, it ap- pears, is to confine the doctrine of constructive contempt to cases falling within