Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/873

837 NOTES 837 such alacrity to return, when the submarine took herself off and left them free from that menace. They thought the ship was sinking when they lost sight of her, but that is a common expectation when the crew abandon a ship. They afterwards inferred that she had sunk. It is plain that they had no intention of returning when they got to Aberdeen, and the master telegraphed to the owners that she had been sunk by a submarine. As the conduct of the master and crew after the departure of the submarine, which was emphasized by Lord Sumner, as well as by Pickford, L. J., is not considered by the majority of the lords, the case is left in rather an unsatisfactory state. J. L. Thorndike. Right to Strike in War Time. — The effect of a national emergency, such as the war with Germany, on the administration of justice is perhaps most strongly felt in courts of equity, for here there is more room for the exercise of the court's discretion, and hence more opportunity than in courts of law for the influence of considerations of public welfare and even public opinion. A decree was recently issued by the Supreme Court of New York which decided a controversy between individuals largely on the basis of national needs arising out of the war.^ The plaintiff corporation was a shoe manufacturer. Eighty per cent of its output was military equipment for the United States government. It sought an injunction against officers, members, and agents of a labor union who were instigating a strike in the plaintiff's factory. The strike was ac- companied by violence, assaults, and mass picketing. The court issued a permanent injunction against the acts of violence, and also enjoined all strikes "for any cause whatever" for the duration of the war. The acts of violence enjoined were, on the evidence, clearly unlawful, and it is not proposed to discuss that part of the decree. The remainder of the decree, against all strikes for any cause whatever, was based by the court on the contentions that "the principles announced in cases which arose before the war cannot be applied to the relation between workers and employers in war industries in so far as they conflict with the principles and policies of the United States government in the conduct of the war"; that the respective rights and relations of the parties "were modified and controlled by their obligations and duties to the United States government"; and that a labor union has no right "to induce or incite v/orkmen in such industries to strike and not to work, and thereby jeopardize the successful outcome of our country's military operations, . . . even though to do so would have been lawfiil in times of peace." It is fundamental that a court of equity protects individual interests only and not the interests of the state as such. It will, it is true, prevent pubHc nuisances and purprestures upon public rights and property, but this jurisdiction of equity deals with the state as a property owner rather than as a sovereign.^ Equity has, however, no jurisdiction to enjoin crimes.^ It is therefore quite beside the point in the principal case that 1 Rosenwasser Brothers v. Pepper, 172 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1918). 2 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895). See 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 14 ed., § 1248 et seq.; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 3 ed., § 1349.
 * Cope V. District Fair Ass'n, 99 111. 489 (1881). See 4 Pomeroy, § 1347, note.