Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/856

820 820 HARVARD LAW REVIEW fraudulently made to understand a mere betrothal. The com- plainant was at the time of the marriage and suit a resident of Canada; the defendant's residence was not shown. The court relied on Bishop's requirement of domicile. It is hard to say any- thing about the case further than respectfully to dissent from its conclusions. If New Jersey could not say that these parties had never gone through a marriage ceremony, no state could. The strongest case against the position taken in this discussion is another New Jersey decision, Avakian v. Avakian.^^ It was held that the New Jersey court had jurisdiction to annul a marriage contracted in England between a resident of Massachusetts and an Armenian, who at the time was on her way to New Jersey to take up her residence. Here was neither marriage in New Jersey, nor a party there domiciled at the time of the marriage. If the parties were in fact married at all, and the court assumes they were, there would not be a domicile in New Jersey at the time of the suit. Pitney, V. C, who delivered the opinion of the court, is not sure that domicile was necessary, since the defendant was present in court. This case would not support Bishop, either, and would seem to require only presence of the plaintiff and personal service on the defendant. It would have been a hard case on its facts to have decided against the petitioner. If any case could show the undesirable results of Bishop's rule it is the Illinois court's decision in Roth v. Roth.^"^ Roth, a subject of Wiirtemberg, came to Illinois, acquired a domicile, and there made his fortune. He was married, while in Illinois, to a woman who was also domiciled there. Later Roth went back to Wiirtem- berg, where he secured a decree of nuUity of the marriage because he, as a subject of Wiirtemberg, had married outside the country without the sovereign's consent. The Illinois court, while stating that the marriage was valid and binding there (as of course it very clearly was), held that the first wife was not entitled to a widow's share in Roth's Illinois property. Mulkey, J., said: "It was therefore, according to the general current of authority on the subject, entirely competent for the courts of that kingdom having jurisdiction of such matters to give effect to that law by annulling and setting aside the marriage. . . "^* «« 69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 Atl. 521 (1905). " 104 lU. 35 (1882). <» Ibid., so.