Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/820

784 784 HARVARD LAW REVIEW when pa3anent is received. If promises relating to the original security, e. g., power of sale at maturity or reservation of title, are allowable, why not a promise to supplement that security and enable it to fulfill its essential purpose of covering the amount of the note? The question whether the promise is enforceable before ma- turity does not determine whether it is additional, but only whether it renders the time uncertain, an independent problem already considered. A promise to furnish collateral at issue of the instrument may be included in it. Why not a promise to furnish it between issue and maturity? Such a promise for continued ade- quacy of the security is supported by authority, for example, a promise to insure mortgaged property or keep it free from waste,^^^ or even to mortgage future crops.^^^ Therefore, the formal requisite as to additional promises is not violated by a collateral note. A strong argument for this view is made by Judge Baker in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: ^^ "Two separate and distinct matters are involved. Each is to be con- sidered and interpreted as a complete entity, whether they be written upon one paper or several. An unconditional promise to pay a certain sum at a certain time is a matter apart from security by way of deed of trust or mortgage of land or pledge or mortgage of chattels. One is gov- erned by the law merchant, the other by property laws. The owner may rely, if he chooses, exclusively upon the promise to pay, according to its terms. Conditions for his benefit in the mortgage or pledge agreement may be availed of only in his capacity of mortgagee or pledgee; they are limited to the purposes of the mortgage or pledge; they cannot be read into the promise to pay, and so render a certain promise uncertain, con- vert a negotiable into a non-negotiable instrument. ... " But even if the two matters were to be read together, it is clear that the stipulations for additional collaterals and the sale of collaterals are pertinent only to the pledge part of the transaction, and that the only condition which could, in any event, be carried into the promise to pay part is the one by which maturity might be anticipated." 1^1 Hunter v. Clarke, 184 111. 158 (1900); Farmer v. First National Bank of Malvern, 89 Ark. 132 (1909). Des Moines Savings Bank v. Arthur, 163 Iowa, 205, 143 N. W. 556 (1913, N. I. L.) distinguishing Iowa National Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa, 715, 123N. W. 237 (1909, N. I. L.), a chattel note case, which seems a close parallel. ^" Commercial Bank of Selma v. Crenshaw, 103 Ala. 497, 15 So. 741 (1893). See note 1 56. "* Keimedy v. Broderick, 216 Fed. 137 (1914, N. I. L.)