Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/796

760 76o HARVARD LAW REVIEW tions caused by uncertainty of time are fatal to the negotiability of these instruments. While either time paper or demand paper is vaHd, here is paper which is both, and apparently has two maturi- ties of equal importance. It is uncertain whether the Statute of Limitations runs from the fixed date, or from demand, or from issue, whether equities are let in and indorsers should be charged after the fixed date, or after demand, or after a reasonable time from issue. The Massachusetts court concludes that probably the exercise of the holder's option fixes the maturity at the day of de- mand.^^ Consequently, a subsequent purchaser before the fixed date, though ignorant of the dishonor, would be subject to equitable defenses and unable to sue the indorsers if notice of the dishonor had not been given them. This Massachusetts interpretation of the effect of demand by the holder seems untenable. In the first place, a business man would naturally consider that the instrument has only one maturity, the fixed date, and that the demand clause is incidental and subordi- nate, to provide for emergencies. Secondly, these instnmients are negotiable in every state which has adopted the Uniform Act,^^ and it would be contrary to the fundamental rights of the holder in due course to subject him to hidden equities and oblige him to in- vestigate outside facts, inquiring whether demand had been made and refused. Furthermore, an unknown demand should be with- out legal significance. The purchaser of an ordinary demand note within a reasonable time after its issue is not subject to equities if ignorant of a prior dishonor. This brings us to a striking and well-established analogy, which strongly supports the underlying principles of this article. Every bill of exchange payable on time has an implied acceleration provi- sion. Though possessing a fixed date of payment, yet if it is pre- sented for acceptance, and acceptance is refused, it becomes due at once.^^ The time for payment is accelerated. However, the ac- celeration affects only the existing holder and such subsequent changed by Stat. 1888, c. 329, and N. I. L. § 4 (2). Such instruments were upheld at common law elsewhere. Louisville v. Gray, 123 Ala. 251, 26 So. 207 (1898); Protection Insurance Co. v. Bill, 31 Conn. 534 (1863). " 133 Mass. 151, 153 (1882). '^ Negotiable Instruments Law, § 151; Sterry v. Robinson, i Day (Conn.) 11 (1802). d
 * 8 Negotiable Instruments Law, § 4 (2).