Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/794

758 758 HARVARD LAW REVIEW innocent buyer before equities are let in.^^ If his tender is refused, there can be no dispute about the time equities are let in or notice of dishonor should be given, for there is no dishonor. The Statute of Limitations begins to run at the specified date.^^ One difiSculty is that tender stops the running of interest; ^° if the holder after his refusal negotiated the paper to a purchaser without notice of the tender, could that purchaser collect interest? On principle, the tender, Hke actual payment, should affect only holders who know of it.^^ A similar question might arise on an ordinary demand note, negotiated after tender but before equities are let in. Another difi&culty is that the holder may be deprived of his investment at any time if the maker pays up, so that the value is uncertain. The objection, while real, applies also to a demand note. Therefore, an instrument payable on or before a certain date at the option of the maker is negotiable,^^ including such securities as Liberty " Nash V. De Freville, [1900] 2 Q. B. 72 (C. A.); State v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 Cal. 336 (i860). 29 In Ackley v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135, 140 (1885), Harlan, J., said: "The debtor in- curred no legal liability for nonpayment until that day passed." so Wright V. Robinson, 84 Hun (N. Y.) 172, 177, 32 N. Y. Supp. 463 (1895); Chap- man V. Wagner, i Neb. Un. 492, 496 (1901). '1 This was apparently Dean Ames' opinion, 2 Cases on Bills and Notes, 831: "The option of the maker seems indeed to be of no significance, except in the case of interest-bearing instruments, and even in these the fact that the maker may by a tender bar the right of him to whom the tender is made to claim interest accruing sub- sequent to the tender seems hardly to render the instnunent uncertain in the commer- cial sense of the term." But in Pemberton v. Hoosier, i Kan. 108, 114 (1862), Bailey, J., in upholding an "on or before" note, seems to think that a purchase before the ultimate date must in- quire as to the possible prior payment: "The defendants promise to pay a sum'certain on a day certain, provided only, that it is not paid before that time. The condition is only such as the law annexes to all promises to pay, and the effect of expressing such a condition is simply to charge third parties with notice." 32 Cases cited in notes 25, 26, 27, 29, supra; also the following cases out of a large nimiber. Union Loan & Trust Co. v. Southern California Motor Road Co., 51 Fed. 840 (Cal. Code, 1892); Cowing v. Cloud, 16 Colo. App. 326, 65 Pac. 417 (1901); Leader V. Plante, 95 Me. 339, 50 Atl. 54 (1901). First National Bank of Springfield, Ohio v. Skeen, 29 Mo. App. 115 (1888) — if negotiabiUty is denied, lenders will refuse the concession of earlier payment, and "thus ensues oppression of the debtor class," affd. loi Mo. 683; 14 S. W. 732 (1890); Curtis v. Horn, 58 N. H. 504 (1878); National Bank v. Kenney, 98 Texas, 293, 83 S. W. 368 (1904) semhle; Cunningham v. McDon- ald, 98 Texas, 316, 83 S. W. 372 (1904); Lovenberg v. Henry, 104 Texas, 550, 140 S. W. 1079 (191 1), "on or before" construed as maker's option. Contra, Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray (Mass.) 170 (1858); Way v. Smith, iii Mass. 523 (1873); Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137 (1875); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. McCoy, 32 Okla. 277, 122