Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/79

45 THE CHILD LABOR LAW CASE 45 THE CHILD LABOR LAW CASE ON June 3, 19 18, the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional the act of Congress of September i, 1916, entitled "An Act to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor and for other purposes." ^ Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the majority of the court.^ With the dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke concurred. The first section of the act is in the footnote.^ The court held that the act was not a regulation of interstate commerce, but rather of the hours of labor in manufacturing, — a matter exclusively reserved for state control. It was not held that the act was a regulation of interstate commerce and also of manu- facturing; and that the two provisions were inseparable, hence the act was invalid.'* Nor was any point made in either opinion that the act was not confined to the products of child labor, but being directed against the products of the factory in which the child works, was therefore confiscatory and contrary to the Fifth Amendment.^ 1 C. 432, 39 Stat. 675. ' That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign conmierce any article or commodity the product of any mine or quarry, situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or any article or commodity the product of any miU, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of such product there- from children vmder the age of fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the age of fourteen years and sixteen years have been em- ployed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven o'clock post meridian, or before the hour of six o'clock ante meridian: Provided, that a prosecution and conviction of a defendant for the shipment or dehvery for shipment of any article or commodity under the con- ditions herein prohibited shall be a bar to any further prosecution against the same defendant for shipments or deliveries for shipment of any such article or commodity before the beginning of said prosecution. Cases, 207 U. S. 463. ^ It is remarkable that no distinction was taken in this respect. It might well have
 * Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529 (1918).
 * See United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 41 (1869); The Employers' Liability