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726 726 HARVARD LAW REVIEW it to a jury to consider what the words were — [telling them that] 'how- ever, the story as told by the witnesses for the Crown was much more probable, for Sovereigns were not usually advised on such affairs, and it had been shown that on this occasion the King had acted entirely out of his own head. — Here the King's death had certainly been in the contemplation of the prisoner; in wishing a violence to be done which must inevitably have caused his death, he imagined and compassed it.' The jury immediately returned a verdict of guilty; and the frightful sentence of high treason, being pronounced, was carried into execution with all its horrors." Fortunately these two cases have been shown to be incorrectly set forth by Lord Campbell, and do not even form precedents to be over- ruled.^^ Although the federal courts have been none too lenient in con- struing the war legislation,^^ coming sometimes perilously near to the standard which was long erroneously attributed to Chief Justice Billing, no fault can, on the whole, be found with their interpretation of the statute here under discussion. In a recent case ^* the requisites for a threat under the Act are well set forth, (i) The words must import to reasonable hearers an intent to harm the President. (2) If oral, they must have been uttered in the hearing of some cne.^^ But (3) they need not have been addressed to any one; nor (4) need they have been com- municated to the President or have been intended to be communicated to the President. Moreover, under the Act a threat may be conditional. Juries have been permitted to find, or it has been held that they could properly find, the following words to constitute threats: "The President ought to be shot, and I would like to be the one to do it." ^^ "President Wilson ought to be killed. It is a wonder some one has not done it al- ready. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself." ^^ "If I got a chance, I would shoot President Wilson." ^ "I wish the President were in Hell, and if I had the power I would put him there." ^ The first of these cases presents, as the court intimates, a close question, to be de- cided in the light of the circumstances, and the manner of uttering the words. The other cases are clear. '^ Edward Foss in "The Judges of England" (London, 1851, pp. 414-16) sharply criticizes Lord Campbell's sharp strictures on Chief Justice Billing, and shows that the flimsy facts of the above cases were not the real support of the charge of treason, and that Lord Campbell's apparent quotations from the court's charges to the jury are pure fiction. He shows that the true facts are these: Walter Walker was charged with "words spoken of the title of Edward when he was proclaimed"; the story of the buck was a figment, and the charge against Burdet was for conspiracy to kill the King and Prince "by casting their nativity, foretelling the speedy death of both, and scattering papers containing the prophecy among the people." " See note, "The Espionage Cases," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 417. See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Freedom of Speech," 17 New Republic, No. 211, 66. 1* United States v. Stobo, 251 Fed. 689 (Dist. Ct., Del, 1918). ^' It was for omitting to allege that the words were uttered in the hearing of any one that the indictment in United States v. Stobo failed. '" United States v. Stobo, note 18, supra. " United States v. Stickrath, 242 Fed. 151 (So. Dist. Ohio, 1917). ^ United States v. Jasick, 252 Fed. 931 (East. Dist. Mich., 1918). » Clark V. United States, 250 Fed. 449 (Circ. Ct. App., Fifth Circ, 1918).