Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/760

724 724 HARVARD LAW REVIEW with whatever additional power is included in the "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations" respecting these lands. This clause properly construed should give Congress control over the public lands while they are public lands, but should confer no power over land which has ceased to be a part of the public domain.^^ Threats to Take the Life of the President. — The meaning of the word "threat," as used in the federal legislation of February 14, 1917,^ obviously differs from the usual legal meaning. In the cases of the statutory offense of threatening a private individual,^ extortion,^ robbery by threat,^ or the avoidance of instruments or acts as induced by threats,^ the menace must be communicated to the threatened person and must be such as at least to influence the mind of a reasonable man. In the case of an assault ^ the words must in addition import to the reasonable hearer an intention to execute it almost immediately; and hence a threat of harm conditioned upon a future event cannot consti- tute an assault.^ But to interpret the word " threat" as used in this law of Congress to mean a "menace of such a nature as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that free and voluntary action which alone constitutes consent," * would de- 41 Fed. 70, 72 (1889) ; Minnesota v. Bachelder, 5 Minn. 223, 235 (1861). Cf. Van Brock- lin V. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1885); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1906). •* The power " to dispose of" includes the power to lease. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 526 (1840). " [Congress] had no power whatever to enlarge the rights of the vendees of the United States as against rights already vested in prior purchasers. It could in no way author- ize any encroachment by the grantees of the United States upon, or injury to, the property of other private parties." Per Sawyer, J., in Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Min. Co., 18 Fed. 753, 771 (1884). Cf. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 498, 517 (1839)- causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any postoffice or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or docimient containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not ex- ceeding five years, or both." 39 Stat. 919, c. 64. Constitutionally the Act may be supported on the broad ground of a right in the federal government to punish offenses aimed at its integrity, but certainly on the nar- rower ground of a right to protect its officers. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. i (1889). See Bikl6, "The Jurisdiction of the United States over Seditious Libel," 41 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) I. In United States v. Metzdorf, 252 Fed. 933 (Dist. Ct., Mon., 1918), the in- dictment failed on the strange ground that it did not state that the alleged threat was uttered of the President in his official character. The court held that Congress had no power to protect its officers in their private capacities. Thus jurisdiction for the mur- der of a federal official would be made to turn on the motive of the killing. ^ State V. McGee, 80 Conn. 614, 69 Atl. 1059 (1908). ' People V. Williams, 127 Cal. 212, 59 Pac. 581 (1899). •• Rex V. Fuller, Russ. & Ryan's Crown Cases, 408 (1820). (1877). ^ Tuberville v. Savage, i Mod. 3 (1669). Cf. Commonwealth v. Eyre, i Serg. & R. (Pa.) 347 (1815). ' In United States v. French this definition was applied, erroneously, it is believed, to the Act of Feb. 14, 1917. 243 Fed. 785 (So. Dist. Fla., 1917).
 * The Act provides: "That any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or
 * Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 55 (1853).
 * Stephens v. Myers, 4 Carr. & Payne 349 (1830); Townsdin t>. Nutt, 19 Kan. 282