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717 NOTES 717 privati only.^ One may enter upon such service voluntarily without preparing the public for his advent,^ but, because he has by his repre- sentations led the public to rely upon the service, he may not withdraw from performing the service without reasonable notice to the public' What constitutes reasonable notice is a question of fact in each case depending upon the character and importance of the business.^ The case of People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title 6* Trust Co.^ recently decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, raises the question whether one who is engaged in public service must, in attempting to withdraw therefrom and dismantle his plant, not only give reasonable notice to that effect but in addition obtain the consent of the state. In that case a court of equity upon foreclosure proceedings, without the consent of the Public Utilities Commission, ordered the receiver of the Colorado Midland Railroad Company to discontinue service and dis-/ mantle the railroad.^ The Supreme Court of Colorado held this order void on the ground that under the Public Utilities Act which conferred upon the commission power to regulate service, the commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not a railroad company may cease operation and dismantle its plant. The problem whether a public utility may discontinue service and dismantle its plant only with consent of the state must be considered from two different viewpoints: that of the chartered corporation, and that of the unincorporated proprietor. As to the former, there are three types of charters: first, those clearly mandatory; second, those which are in general terms only, being neither clearly mandatory nor clearly permissive; and third, those clearly permissive. The case of the mandatory charter raises no difficulty. So long as the corporation retains its charter it is bound by the terms thereof and may be compelled to continue operation.'' The only limitation upon the 1 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); New York Stock Exchange :;. Board of Trade, 127 111. 153, 19 N. E. 855 (1889); i Harg. Law Tracts, 78; 32 Harv. L. Rev. 169. to I Harg. Law Tracts, 6, it appears that because of the King's ancient right of prerogative over rivers and arms of the sea "no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the King." ' I Wyman, § 316, and cases cited. quickly make other arrangements. A canal boatman might tie up at the end of any trip, for other opportunities for shippers over the canal are numerous. But a railroad company may not without a long notice abandon its line. And a gas company could abandon its service only after a long enough period to provide a new supply." i Wy- man, § 317, and see cases there cited. For decisions by pubhc service commissions on the point, see Re Tidewater & W. R. Co., P. U. R. 191 7 E, 798 (Va. State Corp. Com.); Re Delaware & H. Co., P. U. R. 1917 A, 715 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Com., 2d Dist.); Ex parte Central Illinois Public Service Co., P. U. R. 1916 B, 920 (111. Pub. Util. Com.). « 178 Pac. 6 (Colo.) (1918). raised as to the power of the court to direct that the receiver exercise more than his customary function of preserving the assets from waste and destruction. See Equit- able Trust Co. V. Great Shoshone Co., 158 C. C. A. 99, 105, 245 Fed. 697, 703 (191 7); Kokernot v. Rocs, 189 S. W. 505, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.) (1916); High, Receivers, 4ed., § 5. ^ Southern Railway Co. v. Hatchett, 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W. 694 (1917); State ex rel.
 * I Wyman, Public Service Corporations, §§ 316, 330. However, according
 * "A teamster might withdraw upon a day's notice doubtless, as his patrons may
 * Since the railroad company appeared and consented to this order no question was