Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/691

Rh It has already been recognized that natural persons stand in a different relation to the state of their choice than does a corpora- tion. From domiciled individuals a state may with propriety ex- act tribute from all their gains. No serious question is likely to arise as to the taxation at the domicil of the recipient of income from intangibles which are relieved of other burdens. If the prop- erty is taxable to the owner on the principle of mohilia sequuntur personam, the income therefrom should receive similar treatment. But income from extra-state realty and from extra-state business may conceivably stand on a different footing. A tax on the former is not likely to raise any question under the commerce clause, even when the recipient is engaged in interstate commerce. His inter- state business is not less profitable because he gets less from other sources. The only complaint against a tax on income from extra- state realty would be based on the denial of due process of law. The argument would be that, as the source of the income is beyond the jurisdiction, the income is also. Pollock v. Farmers^ Loan 6* Trust Co. would naturally be relied on to support such a con- tention, but the issue in that case can be distinguished from that now under consideration. The source of income may deter- mine whether a tax thereon is a direct or indirect tax within the meaning of the fourth clause of Article I, section 9, of the federal Constitution, and still not determine whether there is state juris- diction within the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. An expression of Mr. Justice Hohnes in the latest case on the taxation of intangibles to their owner at his domicil has possibilities of application to the taxation of income:

"The present tax is a tax upon the person, as is shown by the form of the suit, and is imposed, it may be presumed, for the general advan- tages of living within the jurisdiction. These advantages, if the State