Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/665

629 JURISDICTION TO TAX 629 control over personal property as well as land there, and extends the privilege of succession to it, nevertheless, as will be seen, almost every common-law state does in fact regulate the succession of personal property situated within it by the rules of succession which prevail at the domicile of the decedent. The sovereign of the domicile, therefore, as well as the sovereign of situs extends to the successor the privilege of taking the property, since in order to take he must secure a provision to that effect in the laws of the domicUe. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin : ^^ the transfer of property. If this fund had passed by intestate succession it would be recognized that by the traditions of our law the property is regarded as a universitas the succession to which is incident to the suc- cession to the persona of the deceased. As the States where the property is situated, if governed by the common law, generally recognize the law of the domicile as determining the succession, it may be said that, in a practical sense at least, the law of the domicile is needed to establish the inheritance. Therefore the inheritance may be taxed at the place of domicile." It follows that the succession to all personal property, wherever situated, may be taxed at the domicile of the decedent; ^^ and this is usually done,^^" This includes the taxation there of all debts due to the deceased, even those secured by mortgage of foreign land.^^^ In a few states it is held that the act does not extend to the taxation of foreign chattels; the operation of the act being re- ^ Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525 (1912). ^* Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. (U. S.) 456 (1854); Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578 (1902); Gallup's Appeal, 76 Conn. 617, 57 Atl. 699 (1904); Hopkins' Appeal, 77 Conn. 644, 60 Atl. 657 (1905); Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 55 N. E. 623 (1899); Mann v. Carter, 74 N. H. 345, 68 Atl. 130 (1907); Hartman's Case, 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 62 Atl. 560 (1905); Matter of Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1893); Matter of Merriam, 141 N. Y. 479, 36 N. E. 505 (1894); Matter of Dingman, 66 App. Div. 228, 72 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1901); In re Short's Estate, 16 Pa. 63 (1851); Stanton's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 371 (1894); Estate of Bullen, 143 Wis. 512, 128 N. W. 109 (1910); In re Ewin, i Cr. & J. 151 (1830); In re Coales, 7 M. & W. 390 (1841); Attorney-General v. Napier, 6 Ex. 217 (1851). 22" Matter of Corning, 3 N. Y. Misc. 160, 23 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1893); Stanton's Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 371 (1894); In re Howard, 80 Vt. 489, 68 Atl. 513 (1907).
 * ' The power to tax is not limited in the same way as the power to affect
 * ^ 240 U. S. 625, 631 (1916).