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567 NOTES. 567 possibilities of realization.' On the other hand, there has been a growing recognition that such values deserve better treatment at the hands of the courts. Thus the infliction of harm on another through the exercise of a right otherwise legal, when the reason for such exercise was malice, has been declared a wrong.* The taking away of another's customers, although only the usual means of competition were used, has been held actionable when the motive was not the continued prosecution of a competing enterprise but destruction of the plaintiff's business.^ It was not, indeed, until the nineteenth century that there was general recogni- tion that "passing off" one's goods as those of another by means of similarity of marks and names is a tort.^ The law of unfair competition has grown with the growth of printing and transportation and the consequent increase of values based upon reputation.'^ This in itself is a strong argument against the view that a limited or ^wa^i-property in news cannot be recognized for lack of a close analogy in previous cases. It is submitted that many or most of the cases where such values have not been protected from appropriation may be explained on the ground of social poHcy, and that this is the test which should be applied.^ The common law secured to an author the right of first publication.^ But once he had "dedicated his work to the pubhc" it was held that duplication in competition with him was permissible.^'^ The public interest in the discovery of truth requires that one's right of property in his mind-creations come to an end at some point. Society will eventually demand that another be allowed to appropriate these values. The common law, however, drew its arbitrary line too close. That this was felt by the judges is indicated by the decisions, some of which go a long way, holding that a private circulation of a writing, the oral delivery of a lecture, or even a series of public performances of a play or opera, does not constitute a dedication to the public." Subsequent legislators recognized the counter-policy that industry and invention must be stimulated by a greater legal protection to its fruits. There are numerous instances where on public grounds profiting by another's labor is permitted. One whose activities form the subject- » Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540 (1891); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 311 (1871); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (1912); Dixnston v. Los Angeles Van, etc. Co., 165 Cal. 89, 131 Pac. 115 (1913); Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174 Mo. App. 238, 156 S. W. 767 (1913)- « Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381 (1890); Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Wilson v. Irwin, 144 Ky. 311, 138 S. W. 373 (1911). 5 Tuttle V. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa, 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911). « See Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537 (1891). See also Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition, 3 ed., § 20. ^ See Hopkins, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, supra, §§ 19-20. ' See the opinions in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. ion (1900). See also Wyman, "Competition and the Law," 15 Harv. L. Rev. 427, and Jeremiah Smith, "Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation," 20 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 345, 429. Telegraph Co., 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 194 (1876). 1" Wagner v. Conried, 125 Fed. 798 (1903); Jewelers' Agency v. Jewelers' Publishing Co., 15s N. Y. 241, 49 N. E. 872 (1898). ^ " Boucicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 87, Fed. Case, No. i, 691 (1862); Aronson v. Baker 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 Atl. 177 (1887); Universal Film Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577,'
 * Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 652 (1848); Kieman v. Manhattan