Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/471

435 RECENT CASES 435 June 15, 191 7, excluded the plaintiff's publication from the mails on the grounds that such publication was in violation of Title i, Section 3 of the same act. Plaintiff sought an injunction. Held, refused. The Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A., 2d Circuit). For a discussion of the principles involved, see Notes, page 417. Damages — Breach of Contract — Loss of Publicity. — The plain- tiff was an artist of rising renown, and had entered into a four-year contract with the defendant, the conductor of a weU-known London music hall. There was no express term assuring the plaintiff opportunity to perform. But other clauses provided that the artist should not, for specified periods, perform at any other place of amusement within a specified radius of the music hall, etc. Defendant repudiated the contract during the first year of its intended duration, and the plaintiff sues for loss of salary and loss of publicity. Held, damages for loss of publicity are too remote to be recoverable. Tuppin v. Victoria Palace, Limited, [1918] 2 K. B. 539. For breach of contract damages are either those naturally resultant, or what might reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they contracted, as the probable result of the breach of it. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. But express terms are not neces- sary. Marzetti v. Williams, i B. & A. 415, 423. A contemplated term of contract is often inad'^/'ertently omitted where the happening of the event is unlikely, or where the term does not favor the party drawing up the con- tract. In saying that the contract is a good business arrangement without such contemplated term, the court fails to appreciate the importance of the contemplation of the parties. The peculiar value of publicity to a rising artist of such an engagement, in a city known as the key to artistic fame, is beyond question. Moreover, the articles of contract contemplate action, not inaction. Though perfectly possible for a contract to contemplate a "pinch hitter" or an "understudy" whose services are to be solely within the discretion of the employer, the principal case warrants a contrary deci- sion. The exact point raised in the principal case was essential to the deci- sion of a case of recognized authority and therein the peculiar situation of an actor was distinguished. Fletcher v. Montgomery, 2,3, Beav. 22. In fail- ing to distinguish between the purely incidental tortious element in breach of contract and a uniquely valuable consideration, the court unfortunately contradicted the good precedents it admits as law, and, in an important case, drew the line on the wrong side. Elections — Ineligibility of Candidate Receiving Highest Vote — Notice to Electors. — The Direct Primary Law provided that no candi- date who failed to receive the highest number of votes for the nomination of the political party with which he was affiliated thirty-five days before election should be entitled to be the candidate of any other political party. (1917 Cal. Stats. 1356). The candidate in question failed to receive the highest number of votes as candidate for Republican nominee, but did re- ceive the highest number of votes as candidate for Democratic nominee. Held, that there was no nomination by the Democratic party. Heney v. Jordan, 175 Pac. 402 (Cal.). The English and American authorities are agreed that if the candidate at an election who receives the highest number of votes is ineligible, and his ineligibility is not known to the voters at the time of casting their votes, such votes are not considered as nullities, but are effective to prevent the election of the candidate receiving the next highest number. The King v. Bridge, i M. & S. 76; The Queen v. Hiorns 7, A. & E. 960; State ex rel. Good- ell V. McGeary, 69 Vt. 461, 38 Atl. 165; Heald v. Payson, no Me. 204, 85