Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/460

424 424 HARVARD LAW REVIEW V. Purnell,^ defendant's sheep trespassed on plaintiff's land, where they developed scab, as a result of which they were interned on plain- tiff's land along with plaintiff's own sheep. Plaintiff was allowed to recover the whole damage, without proof of scienter. Cox v. Burbidge was distinguished on the ground that there the injury was not, while here it was a "natural" result of the trespass, and on the ground that there the plaintiff had no case for trespass, while here he had such a case with matter in aggravation of the damage. Cooke v. Waring ^' was distinguished on the latter ground. As to the first ground the artifi- ciality of the uses of "natural" in this connection has been pointed out.2* About all that can be made out from the decisions is that cases where a recovery has been allowed involve "natural" results, where- fore a recovery; while those in which it was not allowed do not involve such results, wherefore no recovery. As to the other ground, it seems futile to distinguish between an injury to the owner of the land, who could bring an action of trespass quare clausum, and one to his mother, living with him on the land, who could not.^^ The strongest argument against liability without scienter in these cases is in the dissenting opin- ion in Troth v. Wills.^'^ But in the case there put of injury to a child of the landowner by a trespassing pet lamb or by a trespassing hen (assuming that the owner of the animal would be liable in trespass for an invasion of another's land by a hen),^^ if it is the duty of the owner of the animal to keep it off of the neighbor's ground, may not the latter reasonably assume that the animal will not be there, and allow the child to act accordingly? Ought we to ask the owner of land to take the risk of another's stray animal which the other is bound to keep off ? Theyer v. Purnell, in its result and in refusing to apply Cox v. Bur- bidge, is significant as one of many recent cases whidi are compelling us to revise the nineteenth-century theory of liability. Effect of Ownership of All the Stock of One Corporation by A Second Corporation; Llability of a Parent Corporation for the Debts of a Subsidiary Corporation; Subsidiary Corporations as Agents. — The recent case of New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter^ pre- sented the following state of facts: The Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company owned a controlling interest in the Wheeling, Lake Erie and Pittsburgh Coal Company. The coal company mined coal which was used as fuel by, or shipped over the lines of, the railway company. Both companies were in the hands of receivers. There were outstanding against the coal company certain mortgage bonds (and also certain 2« [1918] 2 K. B. 333. " 2 H. & C. 332 (1863). 28 Mayne, Damages, 8 ed., 77. Compare other artificial uses of this word, Sal- MOND, Torts, 4 ed., § 61, note 13. ^^ Compare the remarks of Phillimore, J., on an analogous situation in Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K. B. 669, 684-85. »« 8 Pa. Sup. Ct. I (1898). » See State v. Neal, 120 N. C. 613, 27 S. E. 81 (1897). > 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A., 6th Circ.) (1918).