Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/46

12 12 HARVARD LAW REVIEW surety for him, if a certain credit was extended,^* or an offer to guarantee acceptance and payment of drafts,'^ or an offer to the addressee to "see him paid," which would at least suggest an offer to become secondarily liable.^" Obvious difficulties involved in the law of suretyship and guaranty led the courts to strain the construction a bit in order to bring such cases within the offer theory of letters of credit; though other courts have refused to treat such papers as more than offers toljecome siu-ety or guarantor and have distinguished them from letters of credit.^^ Where the wider interpretation is given to the paper, it must be upon some notion that the addressee has changed his position upon the faith of an understanding of its terms which though not correct he might reasonably entertain; in other words upon the theory of estoppel. Confusion has arisen in carrying out this offer theory, which in itself is simple and consistent enough, by importing into it a ques- tion of the law of negotiable instruments that seems superficially to be involved but in reahty is quite beside the point. If one agrees to accept a bill already drawn, or one to be drawn, in such wise as clearly to point out the very instrument, a court of equity, to prevent embarrassment of the case of the holder because of his want of the written evidence to which he is specifically entitled, would decree the promised acceptance.^ And courts of law ac- cordingly have treated a promise thus specifically enforceable as amounting to an acceptance and have allowed the promisee to sue the promisor as an acceptor. But the terms of the promise must be clear and definite in order to be specifically enforceable; and so, if the bill or bills are to be drawn in the future, courts may properly '* Lawrason v. Mason, supra. "Let Mr. G. have your fann ... for the term of five years and I will see you paid." G showed this letter to plaintiff, who leased the farm to him on the strength of it. The court said it was "a general letter of credit." If it had been treated as a guarantee, a question would have arisen whether, under the statute of frauds, it was necessary that the name of the addressee appear on the letter. The court obviously sought to avoid this. « E. g., ScTihneTv. Rutherford, 65 Iowa, 551, 22 N. W. 670 (1885). The letter read: "A. P. Kenyon wants a little money; if you want anyone on the note, I will fix it when I come in." The court refused to treat this as more than it professed to be, to wit, an offer to become surety on Kenyon's note if money was loaned him. <* Bank of Montreal v. Thomas, 16 Ont. 503 (iJ
 * ' Union Bank v. Coster, supra.
 * » Cheever v. Schall, 87 Hun (N. Y.) 32 (1895). Here the letter in suit read: