Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/377

341 PROBLEMS IN PROBATE^ AND ADMINISTRATION 341 plication for relief from error is a defense only if it is accompanied by circumstances prejudicing the defendant.^^" It is often said that the right to set aside a fraudulent bargain must be exercised with reasonable promptness after discovery of the fraud.^^^ But " the question of how much time a party to a contract has per- mitted to elapse is not necessarily determinative of the right to rescind, the immediate consideration being whether the period has been long enough to result in prejudice to the defendant. "^^^ The Weber, 19 N. D. 702, 124 N. W. 952 (1910); McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579, 34 Atl. 455 (1896); City Nat. Bank v. Peed, 32 S. E. 34 (Va.) (1899). But see Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55 (1876); Stanley Rule Co. v. Bailey, 45 Conn. 464 (1878); Norton V. Marden, 15 Me. 45 (1838); Ash v. McLeUan, loi Me. 17, 62 Atl. 598 (1905); Wheeler V. Hathaway, 58 Mich. 77, 24 N. W. 780 (1885); Brummitt v. McGuire, 107 N. C. 351, 12 S. E. 191 (1890); First Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 122 N. C. 569, 29 S. E. 831 (1898) Simmons v. Looney, 41 W. Va. 738, 24 S. E. 677 (1896). 1*" Newman v. Milner, 2 Ves. Jr. 483 (1794); Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55 (1876) Kinney v. Consohdated Virginia Min. Co., 4 Sawyer (U. S. C. C.) 382 (1877); PauUson V. Van Iderstine, 28 N. J. Eq. 306 (1877); Holt v. Ruleau, 102 Atl. 934 (Vt.) (1918) Sable V. Maloney, 48 Wis. 331, 4 N. W. 479 (1880); Van Brunt v. Ferguson, 163 Wis. 540, 158 N. W. 295 (1916). 1" Clough V. London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 26 (1871); Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 (1875) ; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578 (1878) ; Mudsill Mining Co. v. Watrous, 61 Fed. 163 (1894); Blank v. Aronson, 187 Fed. 241 (1911); Bowden v. Spellman, 59, Ark. 251, 27 S. W. 602 (1894); Board of Water Comm'rs v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 74 Atl. 938 (1909); Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. v. Butler, 83 Iowa, 124, 129, 48 N. W. 1026 (1891); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Wheeler, 150 Ky. 169, 150 S. W. 2)3 (1912); Byrd V. Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 36 Atl. 1099 (1897); Boles v. Merrill, 173 Mass. 491, 53 N. E. 894 (1899); Barnard v. Campbell, 58 N. Y. 73 (1874); Ditton v. Purcell, 21 N. Dak. 648, 132 N. W. 347 (1911); Robinson v. Roberts, 20 Okla. 787, 95 Pac. 246 (1908); Koehler v. Dennison, 72 Ore. 362, 143 Pac. 649 (1914). ^*2 Brown v. Young, 62 Ind. App. 364, 374 (1916). And see Basye v. Paola Refin- ing Co., 79 Kan. 755, loi Pac. 658 (1909); Armstrong v. Jackson, [1917] 2 K. B. 822, 830. In Roberts v. Jarnes, 83 N. J. L. 492, 495, 496, 85 Atl. 244 (191 2), Judge Swayze said: "It is also settled that one who desires to rescind a contract, must act within a reasonable time. Dennis v. Jones, 17 Stew. Eq. 513; Clampitti). Doyle, 3 Buch. 678. What is a reasonable time necessarily depends on the circimistances of each particular case. It is settled in the English courts that unless the situation of the other party has changed to his detriment, the contract continues until the party defrauded elects to avoid it, and he may keep the question open as long as he does nothing to afl&rm the contract. Clough v. London and Northwestern Railway (1871), L. R. 7 Ex. 26, 41 L. J. Exch. 17; Morrison v. Universal Marine Insurance Co. (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 197, 42 L. J. Exch. 115; United Shoe Machinery Co. of Canada v. Brunet (1909), A. C. 330. He may even wait until action is brought against him (Clough v. London and Northwestern Railway, uhi supra), and a plea setting up the fraud amounts to a rescission of the contract. Lawton v. Elmore, 27 L. J. Ex. 141; Dawes V. Harness, L. R. 10 C. P. 166, 44 L. J. C. P. 194; Aaron's Reefs v. Twiss (1896), A. C. 273, 65 L. J. P. C. 54. The case last cited was an action by a company against