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310 3IO ' HARVARD LAW REVIEW evidencing this intention. In lieu of such language, a special and definite procedure is established. (b) The action of the President, or of his duly constituted representative, in initiating rates, etc., involves the exercise of discretion and consequently woidd not be subject to judicial con- trol,^® and it would seem necessarily to follow that the exercise of such discretion would not be subject to administrative control except to the extent that the act of Congress specifically makes it so. (c) In like manner, a proceeding against the Director-General is in substance a proceeding against the United States and accord- ingly cannot be maintained except by the express permission of the government,^ ^ and whatever be the construction to be given to section 15, it certainly contains nothing evidencing the consent of the United States to be made respondent in proceedings before state commissions. The remedy specifically allowed before the Interstate Commerce Commission is therefore created by the statute, and it is impossible to find a justification for any other remedy elsewhere. Necessarily, this remedy is exclusion. And this conclusion is reenforced by the provisions of the first paragraph of section 10, which authorize "actions at law or suits in equity" to be brought by and against "carriers." Now if it should be held that this paragraph is intended to authorize a pro- ceeding against the United States, a conclusion of doubtful sound- ness, it is highly significant that it does not authorize proceedings before state commissions. "Actions at law" and "suits in equity" are technical phrases indicating well-known forms of procedure and do not include proceedings before commissions. This consideration, therefore, lends weight to the view that the statutory remedy before the Interstate Commerce Commission is the only remedy intended to be available in connection with rates, etc., initiated by the President. The second well-settled rule which reenforces the conclusion reached from a scrutiny of the language of the act, that the remedy before the Interstate Commerce Commission is exclusive, is found in the principle that when one part of a statute deals specifically " Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U. S.), 137 (1803). " Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70 (1908); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627 (1914); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52 (191 7).