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302 302 HARVARD LAW REVIEW in the case of intrastate movements than in the case of those which are interstate. A certain degree of confusion of thought seems to be engendered by the affirmative grant to Congress of the power to regulate com- merce among the states, and the resulting habit of mind to attrib- ute control over intrastate commerce to the states. But assume for the moment that the Constitution contained no grant of power to Congress with respect to commerce. Clearly, it would never- theless be able, imder the war power, to do just what it has done with respect to the transportation systems of the country. And from what source then would be derived the contention that the federal power is restricted to dealing with interstate rates? In any event, the President is authorized in section lo, "whenever in his opinion the public interest requires," to "initiate rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices," and this power, granted without qualification or limitation, cannot be restricted by the courts to the field of interstate commerce. This proposition is. amply supported by the authorities.^ In the Trade-Mark cases,^ the court, dealing with the general language of the act of Congress there under consideration, said: "It has been suggested that if Congress has power to regulate trade- marks used in coramerce with foreign nations and among the several States, these statutes shall be held valid in that class of cases, if no further. To this there are two objections: First, the indictments in these cases do not show that the trade-marks which are wrongfully used were trade-marks used in that kind of commerce. Secondly, while it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and void, the court may enforce the valid part where they are distinctly separable so that each -can stand alone, it is not within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body." And it is highly significant that in the three cases cited in the note the Supreme Court refused to limit the general language ' United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 220-21 (1875); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 98 (1880); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 500-01 (1908). 8 100 U. S. 98.