Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/319

283 NOTES 283 if a city ordinance requires a fireman to be stationed at a theatre, it has been properly held that the owner could not be required to pay the ex- pense;^ but the opposite decision has also been reached.® A somewhat similar question is raised by an ordinance requiring an abutting owner to clear snow off his sidewalk at his own expense. This ordinance has been held vahd,^ but the better view appears to be that the ordinance is unreasonable, since it requires a single class of abutting owners to pay for a purely public benefit.* If, however, a landowner desires and asks for special protection, not required for the public interest, it is common practice, and it would seem theoretically sound to require payment. A recent English case. Grays Urban District Council v. Grays Chemical Works, Limited,^ seems to be decided upon this correct distinction. The defendant was owner of an acid plant, of which the roof had caved in; there was danger that the premises would catch fire from acid flowing out of broken carboys. He accordingly called the fire department of plaintiff District Council, and the department remained until the im- mediate danger of fire was over. He then asked that firemen be supplied to watch the premises during the removal of the debris, and four firemen remained for several days. Plaintiff having sued for compensation for services of the firemen on the first day, and also for the services of the four left to watch the premises, it was held that the defendant could not be called upon to pay for the services of the department, but that he must pay for the time of the four men who were left to watch the debris. Mistake of Law in Equity and at Law. — American courts in their latest decisions have clearly displayed the tendency to confine the mistake of law doctrine within even narrower limits than heretofore. They still sternly declare that ignorantia legis non excusat, but we find them nevertheless granting relief in the particular cases under the guise of some exception to the rule. With respect to reformation of instru- ments the greatest liberality has been evidenced, while with cases in- volving recovery of money paid under mistake, occurring as they do, chiefly at law, the rule has been relaxed to a less degree. In many cases where relief for a mistake of law has been refused, the court would have reached a like result even if the mistake had been one of fact.^ On the other hand, some jurisdictions have refused to subscribe to the progres- sive tendency and have of late appHed the doctrine in all its rigor.^ ° Tannenbaum v. Rehm, 152 Ala. 494, 44 So. 532. ' Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504. » [1918] 2 K. B. 461. ^ See Jacobson v. Mohall Telephone Co., 34 N. D. 213, 157 N. W. io33;'Traweek v. Hagler, 75 So. 152 (Ala.); Porter v. Wright, 145 Ga. 787, 89 S. E. 838; Johnson v. Hemig, 53 Pa. Sup. Ct. 179; Diebel v. Diebel, 116 Minn. 168, 133 N. W. 463; Houlehan V. Inhabitants of Kennebec County, 108 Me. 397, 81 Atl. 449. ^ Tilton V. Fairmont Lodge, 244 111. 617, 91 N. E. 644; Baker v. Pierce, 197 111. App. 158; Shields v. Hitchman, 251 Pa. 455, 96 Atl. 1039; Clark v. Lehigh Coal Co.,
 * Chicago V. Weber, 246 111. 304, 92 N. E. 859.
 * Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 111. 554.