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279 NOTES ifg of chattels. The other English cases involved agreements as to the prices to be charged upon resale.^ Although these might fairly be said to be restrictive agreements restricting the use of the thing sold, they infringe the policy of the law as to freedom of trade in chattels to such extent that equity might well refuse to give them effect as creating equitable servitudes. In Barker v, Stickney ^ the purchaser of a copy- right covenanted to pay certain royalties. They were not imposed by way of a charge upon the copyright and the court distinguishing the Werderman case declined to allow an equitable servitude. In the United States the courts began by enforcing restrictive agree- ments with respect to the use of chattels in case of patents and copy- rights.* But one of the cases ^ involved, along with a restriction on use, a restriction as to price on resale, and the federal courts are now definitely committed to the doctrine, also established in England, that such agreements will not be enforced against third persons who take with notice.^'' In so deciding they have sometimes argued against allowing equitable servitudes in chattels at all.^^ But in Henry v. Dick Co}^ a restriction on use was enforced against third persons who took a patented article with notice, and Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-^ versal Film Mfg. Co.,^^ which purports to overrule Henry v. Dick Co., was a case in which the restriction on use went beyond what was rea- sonable in order to secure the advantage of the patent on the thing patented and hence was one in which equity, in the case of a restriction upon the use of land, would have refused to allow an equitable servitude. While Sir George Jessel's doctrine of servitudes in chattels on the analogy of Tulk v. Moxhay has appeared to fare hard at the hands of the courts in subsequent cases none of the cases have been such as to present a fair occasion for applying it. If the instinct of common-law lawyers is against such servitudes, the instinct of the mercantile com- munity no less clearly calls for them, and within the recognized limits of the doctrine of equitable servitudes in general the preconceptions of lawyers may yet be found yielding to the exigencies of trade. Doctrine of Ultra Vires as Applied to Business Corpora- tions. — In the case of Cotman v. Brougham ^ the memorandum of association of the company in question contained an objects clause with any theory of equitable servitude. In this respect these cases are analogous to those in which equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment of one who has promised for a consideration in hand to do something with respect to a thing which is to come into existence in the future. 3 Pom. Eq. Jxjr., § 1288. ^ Dimlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. C. 847; McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306; Taddy v. Sterious, [1904] i Ch. 354. ■> [1918] 2 K. B. 356. ' New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co., 28 App. Div. 411, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1093; Murphy v. Christian Press Publishing Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y. Supp. 597. 9 Murphy v. Christian Press Publishing Co., supra. 1" Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. i; Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339; Scribners V. Straus, 210 U. S. 352. " Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park,. 220 U. S. 373; Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24. 12 224 U. S. I. i» 243 U. S. 502. 1 [1918] A. C. S14.