Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/303

267 ACTIONS AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF SOVEREIGNS 267 Marshall's reasoning was fully indorsed by the English Court of Appeals in The Parlement Beige?' The case was a libel to recover damages for a collision brought against a ship belonging to the King of Belgium and used not only in carrying the mails, but also in transporting passengers and freight for hire. During the half century since The Exchange ^ there had been a great growth in the body of the law. Whereas Marshall could not refer to a single opinion to support his conclusions, Lord Esher was able to state that, "exemption from interference by any process of any Court of some property of every sovereign is admitted to be a part of the law of nations." He decided that the principle upon which this exemption rested was the implied agreement among states to re- spect one another's absolute independence of every sovereign authority. He^eld that this principle was applicable to all the property of any state destined to public use. An additional ground of decision was that seizure of property by admiralty process in- directly impleads the owner of the property and, as said by the court, , "The case is, upon this consideration of it, brought within the general rule that a sovereign authority cannot be personally impleaded in any court." 4 The first case to consider carefully the exemption of property of the local sovereign was Briggs v. Light-Boats} Three vessels belonging to the United States and stated to be in their possession, and which had been built for use as floating government Hght- ships, were held not subject to statutory attachment proceedings in a state court. Judge Gray reasoned that a sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent, not because a sovereign cannot command himself, but because he must be free to perform his governmental functions. His property, Ukewise, must be free from court control because it is an instrument of government.* 2 5 P. D. 197 (1880). 3 Supra. conclusion. The American rule is that a collision gives to the party injured a right in rem in the offending ship without regard to personal responsibility, the ship itself being considered the wrongdoer. The Barnstable, 181 U. S. 464, 467 (1901). ^ II AUen (Mass.) 157 (1865). 8 Story, J., in United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumner (U. S.) 308 (1838), took the view that in cases of salvage or general average the argument ah inconvenienti in favor
 * American Courts of Admiralty would probably not accept Lord Esher's second