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180 l8© HARVARD LAW REVIEW licensee's employees negligently damaged the plaintiff. Held, that the licensor is liable. Sorenson v. Chicago, R. I. 6* P. Ry. Co., i68 N. W. 313 (Iowa). Where there is no statutory authorization, the lessor of a railroad is generally held for the liabihty of the lessee in operating the road. Hays v. Railroad-, 20 C. C. A. 52, 74 Fed. 279. If there is such authorization, some courts hold that this carries with it exemption by necessary implication. Hahs v. Cape Girardeau b'C. R. Co., 126 S. W. 525 (Mo.); Vadas v. Pittsburg M. &• Y. R. Co., 263 Pa. 41, 79 Atl. 166. See 20 Harv. L. Rev. 334. However, it would seem that mere permission to do acts which otherwise might be illegal does not absolve the lessor by necessary implication, dinger's Adm'x v. Chesapeake 6* O. Ry. Co., 3i Ky. Law R. 86, 109 S. W. 315. In the principal case it was a license to use the tracks. In such a case the licensor has, in absence of statutory authorization, been held liable. Jejfferson v. Chicago 6* N. W. Ry. Co., 117 Wis. 549, 94 N. W. 289; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ellett, 132 111. 654, 24 N. E. 559; Chicago 6* E. R. Co. v. Meech, 163 111. 305, 45 N. E. 290. If there is statutory authority some courts might make a distinction between a lease and a license of joint user. See i Elliott, Railroads, 2 ed., § 477. It is submitted, however, that the principal case rests the lessor's or hcensor's liability on its true basis. The franchise has imposed duties upon the railway, the occupier of the premises, to operate its road carefully. The railway may carry them out through lessees or licensees, but it must see to it that no one is injured by any breach of duty or negligent use, unless a statute expressly «cempts it from liability. Braslin v. Somerville Horse R. Co., 145 Mass. 64, 13 N. E. 65; Chicago 6* Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Hart, 209 111. 414; 70 N. E. 654; dinger's Adm'x v. Chesapeake 6* O. Ry. Co., supra. But see 20 Harv. L. Rev. 334. An analogy is found where the occupier of premises is held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor where he is charged with a "non-delegable duty." Doll 6* Sons v. Ribetti, 121 C. C. A. 621, 203 Fed. 593; Strickland v. Montgomery Lumber Co., 171 N. C. 755, 88 S. E. 340; Covington &" Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Sleinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N. E. 618. Religious Societies — Jurisdiction of Courts — Property Rights. — The constitution of a religious society provided that in case of a schism those adhering to the doctrines of the Lutheran Synod of Missouri should hold the property. The defendants, being a majority of the society, formed a separate organization affiliated with the Lutheran Synod of Iowa, certain essential doctrines of which are repudiated by the Missouri Synod. On demurrer to these facts the right of the defendants to the church property turned on whether it was necessary for some ecclesiastical authority first to determine the doctrinal question involved. Held, that the demurrer be sustained. Bendewald v. Ley, 168 N. W. 693 (N. D.). Although civil courts in this coimtry will not interfere in purely ecclesiastical matters they will take jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to church property. Hendrickson v. Decow, i N. J. Eq. 577; Rottman v. Bartling, 22 Neb. 375) 35 N. W. 126; Fussell v. Hail, 233 111. 73, 84 N. E. 42. Accordingly, where such controversy arises out of a division in a religious society, civil courts will ascertain which of the rival factions continues the original organization and will award it the property. Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. i, 172 S. W. 897; Mack V. Kime, 129 Ga. i, 58 S. E. 184; Horsman v. Allen, 129 Cal. 131, 61 Pac. 796. In a congregational society, where majority rule prevails, the church property is usually given to the numerical majority of the members. Bouldin V. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131; Fernstler v. Seibert, 114 Pa. 196, 6 Atl. 165; Gipson v. Morris, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 645, 73 S. W. 85. But if the society belongs to an ecclesiastical system, the decision of the highest church judicatory on doc- trinal matters is generally accepted as conclusive by the civil courts. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Presbyterian Church v. Cumberland Church, 245 111. 74, f