Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/202

166 i66 HARVARD LAW REVIEW quired naturalization which is a "scrap of paper" here, just as it is in their native countries.^^ The reader will have remarked that all the lines of this brief discussion converge on a common point. Even if the arguments advanced above are mistaken and can be successfully rebutted, it appears that the United States has, since the commencement of the war in 1914, received or purported to receive as citizens nimabers of foreign born individuals whose status is somewhat doubtful here and decidedly doubtful abroad. If we grant that the nations cobelligerent with us are likely in courtesy and good feeling to waive any rights concerning their nationals, our opponents still remain to be considered. Embarrassment amounting to a dilemma is clearly possible. It is hard to see how we can refuse to protect even in Germany a German native naturalized here between August 3, 1914, and the end of the war. Our own statute law requires the executive to tender such protection.^^ Yet if we do so, we shall be denying Germany a right which the United States has recognized and asserted for itself. To put the point in another way, no persons have exceeded Americans in denunciation of those provisions of the Delbriick Law which encourage the conscious creation of dual allegiance. Can we continue this denunciation with much justice if our courts and our Con- gress have been making decisions and passing laws which tend toward precisely the same end? ^^ John M. Maguire. The Theory or the Pleadings. — It might be thought that if a defendant has had ample notice of the claim against him and an oppor- tunity to defend, and the facts have been fully presented on both sides, and a judgment has finally been recovered against him, he ought to pay. Even more clearly it would seem that when the defendant in his answer has expressly admitted a right of action in the plaintiff, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover on that right of action. *In New York ac- cording to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals this is not the case. One Jackson brought suit against one Strong alleging that they had entered into a contract to prosecute an undertaking for their joint benefit, sharing equally as partners in the expenses and in the receipts; and the plaintiff asked for an accounting and for a recovery of the amount due. The defendant denied the agreement to share equally but alleged that he had agreed to employ the plaintiff as his assistant and to pay him the reasonable value of his services. The case was tried before a referee who reported that there was no agreement to share but that the defend- ant had agreed to pay the plaintiff the reasonable value of his services. Judgment was given for the plaintiff for the reasonable value of his serv- ices. After several years the Court of Appeals has at length decided that the judgment should be reversed.^ And why? Not because the ^^ If this doubt turns out to be really substantial, the air should be cleared by a remedial act. 2» U. S. Rev. Stat., § 2000. of the final treaty of peace. Otherwise we have stored up squabbles for the next fifty years. ' Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149. See Recent Cases, page 179.
 * The whole tangled situation should be straightened out by explicit provisions