Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/184

148 148 HARVARD LAW REVIEW arise in showing any recognized connection to permit tacking possessions. Thus where a widow continues in the possession of land held adversely by her deceased husband, it has been held that the widow is not entitled to tack her husband's possession to her own. It is argued that, since the widow has no right in the land before her dower is assigned, her entry is a new disseisin,^^ privity is, however, worked out between husband and wife in numerous cases, which hold that the widow's holding, if in subordination to the heirs at law, may be tacked to that of her husband.^^ Although the widow is neither heir, devisee, nor grantee and does not succeed to her deceased husband's inchoate title, yet if she occupies under her dower, quarantine or homestead right, or as guardian of her children, her possession may be tacked to that of her husband so that it will enure to the benefit of the heirs.^ The holding of a decedent and his personal representative cannot be tacked unless there is a legal right of possession to administer the decedent's lands.^^ It is, however, held that the possession of real estate by an executor with power of sale may be tacked to that of his testator in establishing title by adverse possession.^® The possession of the executor or administrator may be deemed a con- tinuance of that of the deceased, where by statute he has the right to take possession of the real estate and actually does so for the benefit of the estate. The continuity of adverse possession is not interrupted by the ordinary lapse of time between the deceased's death and the appointment of an administrator and the taking of possession by him. It is submitted that there cannot be tacking between testator and devisee under a void will, as there would be no transfer or delivery of possession, and the inchoate possessory title would devolve upon the heir, who would be the only one who could con- tinue the same claim of title, and take advantage of the ancestor's " Doe V. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 945 (1849); Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241 (1852); Robinson v. Allison, 124 Ala. 325, 27 So. 461 (1899). " Mielke v. Dodge, 135 Wis. 388, 393, 115 N. W. 1099 (1908); 14 Harv. L. Rev. 149; 17 Harv. L. Rev. 277. " Atwell V. Shook, 133 N. C. 387, 45 S. E. 777 (1903); Johnson v. Johnson, 106 Ark. 9, 152 S. W. 1017 (1912); Jacobs v. Williams, 173 N. C. 276, 91 S. E. 951 (1917)- " Tennessee Iron Co. v. Ferguson, 35 S. W. 900 (Tenn. Chan. App. 1895). " Cannon v. Prude, 181 Ala. 629, 62 So. 24 (1913); Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, 90 S. E. 993 (1916).