Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/175

139 TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 139 the real action by writ of right for forty years more. Consequently it was held in England that the right of entry and the remedy by ejectment, might be barred, but that the "mere right" itself was left outstanding.^^ To remedy this the Statute 3 & 4 William IV, c. 27 (1833), was enacted, which not only bars the remedy of eject- ment but expressly abolishes real actions and extinguishes the former title after twenty years.^^ By the Real Property Limitation Act of 1874^^ the period of limitation is reduced to twelve years from the time the right of action first accrued. American statutes quite commonly follow the parent statute of James I. Illinois, for example, enacts :^^ " That no person shall commence an action for the recovery of lands, nor make an entry thereon, unless within twenty years (i) after the right to bring such action or make such entry first accrued, or (2) within twenty years after he or those from, by, or under whom he claims, have been seized or possessed of the premises." Since the owner is deemed to be seised or possessed imless there is another in adverse possession, actual or constructive, clauses one (i) and two (2) apparently come to exactly the same thing. The owner's mere absence from the land does not disable him from bringing an action against an intruder. The second clause as to seisin or possession is apparently an interesting relic of the pro- visions of the older type of statutes.^^ The form of statutes of limitation varies; in some of them there are provisions expressly extinguishing the right or title of the former owner; most of them in terms merely bar the remedy by ejectment; but it is the almost invariable rule that the effect of the statute is not only to bar the remedy of ejectment, but also to take away all other remedy, right, and title of the former owner-^** It is well to " Trustees of Dundee Harbor v. Dougall, i MacQueen, H. L. Cas. 317 (1852); 3 Ceuise, Digest Real Prop. 430, 436, 447. " See 10 Law Magazine, or Quart. Rev. of Jurxsp. 357 (1833). " 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57. " Kurd's III. Rev. Stat. (1917) ch. 83, § i. " Agency Co. v. Short, 13 A. C. 793 (1888). See 5 Cal. L. Rev. 429; People's Water Co. v. Boromeo, 31 Cal. App. 270, 160 Pac. 574 (1916). See also Mich. Rev. Stat. (1838) 573, 574, § i. In Riopelle v. Gilman, 23 Mich. ^^ (1871), it is held to produce a different result as to the necessity of privity between successive holders. See note 102, infra. 20 United States v. Chandler, 209 U. S. 447, 450 (1908); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885); Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16, 25, 25 N. E. 312 (1890).