Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/149

113 JENS IVERSON WESTENGARD 113 sound judgment, and a certain quality of intellectual candor and courage which contrasted oddly with his habitual caution. He could neither be forced nor manoeuvered into taking a position, however safe and sound it might seem, until he had convinced him- self that it was, not probably, but surely, so. But once he had con- vinced himself of this, he did not hesitate to express an opinion which others, and those the greatest of authorities, might not share. Thus, when the Supreme Court afl&rmed the District Court's decision in the celebrated case of The Appam, Mr. Westengard, after giving the opinion of the court more consideration than the writer of the opinion appeared to have given to the case, did not hesitate to say (without going into other serious questions pre- sented by the decision), that he wished the court could have felt free to explain, at a httle more length, its reasons for making so distinct an addition to what had been, for more than a century, the settled jurisdiction of neutral courts of admiralty. Mr. Westengard came back to the Law School at a fortunate time, but he had only a short period in which to make a record of his presence. He must have wished, when he began to teach inter- national law, to turn out, as the finished product of his courses, men whose diligence would make the Hbrary of the Marquis de Olivart an asset to the nation, men who, by reason of the intensive training of the case system, would become, not pubHcists who wrote upon international law, but real international lawyers. This, in a small measure only, he may have been permitted to do. But he did succeed in imbuing his pupils with a realization of the inherent fallacy of inter arma leges silent, with a belief that the highest national service is the establishment of international law, and with a deep personal affection for himself. John Raehurn Green. Department of State, Washington, D. C. November 4, 19 18.