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88 88 HARVARD LAW REVIEW deciding the point have denied recovery. Everett v. London, etc. Ins. Co., 19 C. B. (n. s.) 126; Laballero v. Home Muttud Ins. Co., 15 La. Ann. 217. See Taunton v. Royal Ins. Co., 2 H. & M. 135, 138, 10 L. T. (n. s.) 156, 157. In New York, if a fire on the insured's premises causes an explosion, the insured can recover, though loss from explosion was excepted from the policy; but if the fire and explosion are on another's premises, recovery is denied. Hustace V. Phenix Ins. Co., 175 N. Y. 292, 67 N. E. 592. Proximate causation does not explain these cases, as property lines and mere distance are not inter- vening causes. However, insurance policies are construed in accordance with the laws of insurance which cannot follow the chain of causation beyond busi- ness usage and the intention of the parties. The premium is fixed by certain fairly calculable elements of fire insurance. See Zartman & Price, Yale Readings in Insurance — Property Insurance, ch. 8. Such a highly spec- ulative risk as distant air concussion cannot enter into business calculations. Public Service Companies — Rate Regulation — Right of Com- pany TO Increase Rates Fixed by Contract. — PlaintiflF brought suit in equity for specific performance of a ten-year, low-rate .contract made by it with the predecessor of the defendant natural gas company in October, 1913, and for an injunction restraining defendant from cutting off its service in viola- tion thereof, as it had done and threatened to continue to do, unless the plain- tiff, a manufacturing corporation wholly dependent on this service for the operation of its plant, paid the greatly increased rates filed by defendant with the state public service commission. Defendant denied the binding force of said contract, alleging that it was discriminatory, and therefore illegal under the Public Service Company Law which took effect Jan. i, 1914. Previous to filing the increased rates complained of, defendant had twice filed schedules at said contract rate for that class of service. Held, suit dismissed, and legal right of the utiUty company to discontinue said contract and increase rates for that service without first applying to the public service commission for permission sustained. V. &* S. Bottle Co. v. Mountain Gas Co., Pa. Sup. Ct. (June 3, 1918), 13 Rate Research, 335. For discussion of the principles involved, see Notes, p. 74. Taxation — Particular Forms of Taxation — Inheritance Taxes — Tax on the Transfer of Possession or Enjoyment. — A statute pro- vided that an inheritance tax be imposed on aU transfers of property made by a deed intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. Lineal descendants were exempt. In 191 1 C executed a deed to T in trust to pay the income to C during his Ufe, then to distribute among lineal descendants of C. In 1914 an amendment to the statute abolished the exemption of lineal descendants; and in 191 7 C died. Held, the gifts to the lineal descendants are subject to the tax. Carter v. Bugbee, 103 Atl. 818 (N. J.). A voluntary trust completely estabUshed cannot be revoked by the settlor. Lovett V. Farnham, 169 Mass. i, 47 N. E. 246; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300. The principal case follows what appears to be the settled authority that a statute taxing the receipt or transmission of pos- session or enjoyment is imposing a transfer tax as distinguished from a prop- erty tax imposed on ownership. In re Greenes Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292; Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549. See 28 Harv. L. Rev. 437. Cf. 20 Harv. L. Rev. 655. However, if, as the courts admit, the execu- tion of the deed by C gives the descendants a vested equitable interest, it is arguable that a statute passed afterward, which taxes the already vested right to a later possession or enjoyment, goes as far towards imposing a property tax as it would if taxing the receipt of possession by any remainderman or if taxing the reversion of possession to a bailor. The principal case is materially