Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/121

87 RECENT CASES 87 plicitly provides that the employer who pays compensation shall be indemni- fied and "subrogated to the rights of the employee to recover damages therefor." This shows an action by an employee cannot be barred by filing a compensa- tion agreement, for, if so, an employer who is subrogated to the right of the employee could never sue after such agreement. In view of English prece- dents and the evident intent of the act the decision is sound. Municipal Corporations — Redelegation of Delegated Powers — Discretion — Statute. — By statute the city council of Springfield was given authority to Ucense and regulate the transportation of passengers for hire by motor vehicle. (1916, Mass. Stat. c. 293.) Another statute provided that the city council might delegate the granting of Ucenses to other ofiicials and might regulate the granting. (1913, Mass. Stat. c. 429.) The city council passed an ordinance regulating the fee and requirements and delegated to the police commission authority to grant licenses where the applicants were found to be "suitable to conduct such business" and the vehicles, after in- spection, "safe and proper." The defendant was convicted for operating without a license. Held, conviction sustained. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 119 N. E. 687 (Mass.). It is settled that the legislature may delegate powers concerning municipal affairs to municipal corporations. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745; State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 22 Atl. 497. When the method of exer- cising the power is not prescribed by the legislature, the local body may use reasonable discretion. City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 111. 247, 22 N. E. 791; Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380, 20 Atl. 859. See i Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5 ed., § 242 et seq. This discretion as to method of exercising the power cannot be delegated to any other body. Johnson v. The Mayor and Council of City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645; Conn. v. Glavin, 67 Conn. 29; Commonwealth v. McUetsky, 203 Mass. 241, 89 N. E. 245; State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 36; Day v. Green and Another, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433. However, ministerial or administrative fimctions may be dele- gated. Los Angeles, etc. Corp. v. Los Angeles, 163 Cal. 621, 126 Pac. 594; Har- court V. Asbury Park, 62 N. J. L. 158, 40 Atl. 690. The police commission has been allowed to decide whether moving pictures were immoral. Block v. City of Chicago, 239 111. 251, 87 N. E. ion. An ofl&cial has been allowed to de- cide the number and position of saloons. People v. Gregier, 138 111. 401, 28 N. E. 812. And it has been held that discretion in an administrative function may be used whether the ordinance gives it or not. Harrison v. People, 222 111. 150, 78 N. E. 52. The ordinance in the principal case does not set a fixed standard. This is immaterial, for it is impossible to set one, and public policy demands protection of the public. See Block v. City of Chicago, supra, 262, 3. And so the statute in the principal case which allows the above rule of com- mon law is merely affirming the common law and should be construed in accordance with it. Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87. Proximate Cause — What Constitutes in Insurance Contracts. — The plaintiff's vessel lying at anchor 1000 feet off shore was damaged by a concussion of the air caused by an explosion due to fire on shore. Plaintiff's ship was insured in defendant company. The policy covered loss by fire without expressly excepting explosions. Held, insurance company is not liable. Bird v. St. Paul Fire &° Marine Ins. Co., 120 N. E. 86 (N. Y.). A policy of fire insurance covers all damage which, within the meaning of the policy, is the proximate consequence of the fire. Lynn Gas, etc. Co. v. Meri- den Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 2)2) N. E. 690. Logically, damage by concus- sion from a distant explosion of powder caused by fire is a proximate conse- quence of the fire, since no independent cause intervenes, but the few cases