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85 RECENT CASES 85 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 1992. Moreover, the defendant's un- authorized construction of its poles and lines on a street or highway is a pub- lic nuisance. Van Home v. Newark P. Ry. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 332, 21 Atl. 1034. And one suffering a pecuniary loss proximately resulting from a public nui- sance may abate it in equity. Griswold v. Brega, 160 111. 490, 43 N. E. 864. Some courts have refused to grant an injunction because the plaintiff seeks to prevent competition. CoJfeyvUle M. b" G. Co. v. Citizens' N. G. 6* M. Co., supra; Baxter T. Co. v. Cherokee C. M. T. A., 94 Kan. 159, 146 Pac. 324. Pub- lic welfare especially requires that public utilities shall compete whenever conditions warrant it. East St. L. Ry. Co. v. East St. L. U. Ry. Co., 108 111. 265. But free competition in the principal case would be subversive of the public interest, because adequate service there reqviires no duplication. Maucious Prosecution — Civil Suit — Absence of Arrest or Sei- zure. — In an action for malicious prosecution in a civil suit, where there had been neither arrest of the person of the plaintiff nor seizure of his property, held, that the plaintiff could recover. Pearson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 78 S. W. 204 (Ala.). Alabama, meeting this question for the first time, takes its place among the states allowing such recovery. The English rule, owing to the Statute of Marl- bridge (52 Hen. Ill, c. 6), which allowed heavy costs pro f also clamor e to the defendant in a civil action, denies such relief in a separate action for malicious prosecution. Savile v. Roberts, i Ld. Ray. 374. Formerly the weight of Ameri- can authority was in accord with the English rule. Wetmore y. Mellinger, 64 la. 741, 18 N. W. 870; Potts V. Inday, 4 N. J. L. 382. See cases cited in Ames's and Smith's Cases on Torts, Pound's ed., 1917, 650. But now the weight of authority seems to have swung to the other side. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558. On principle, American costs being meagre, the view of the principal case seems sound. The fear of multiplying litigation is without merit. To deny relief might often lead to persecution without remedy. See 9 Harv. L. Rev. 538. Master and Servant — Workmen's Compensation Act — Charita- ble Institution. — An employee sued a purely charitable institution under the Act for injury by a buzz planer. The Massachusetts Workmen's Com- pensation Act in terms includes all employees, one clause specifically except- ing farm laborers and domestic servants. Mass. Stat. 1911, c. 751, §§ i, 2. Held, that charitable institutions are impliedly excepted, Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium 6* Benevolent Association, 119 N. E. 686 (Mass.). Charitable organizations are generally not liable for the negligence of serv- ants or agents. McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. In England the law is in some confusion as regards their liability at common law; hence a decision holding such an institution liable under the Act may not apply to the principal case. MacGillivray v. Institute for The Blind, 1911, S. C. 897, 48 Scot. L. R. 811. Public commissions managing essentially private or quasi-public enterprises have been held to come under the Act. In re Ryan, N. S. Wales St. Rep. 33; Gilroy v. Makie, 1909, S. C. 466, 46 Scot. L. R. But see Brown v. Decatur, 188 111. App. 147. The California Act specifically in- cludes " the state . . . and all . . . having persons in service for hire." 191 7 Stat. c. 2143, § 7- The Massachusetts court properly holds that the specific exemption of farm laborers and domestic servants does not necessarily imply that all other workmen are included. More doubtfully the court finds an im- plied exception in the general intent expressed in the law. The economic principle on which Workmen's Compensation Acts are often justified obviously would not apply to charitable institutions. Yet, as apparently in California, it may be thought that on humanitarian principles every enterprise should