Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/75

 THE HISTORY OF ASSUMPSIT S7

lieth for the money' and not an action of covenant." As late as 1628, in the same court, Berkeley, Serjeant, in answer to the ob- jection that Covenant did not lie, but Debt, against a defendant who had covenanted to perform an agreement, and had obliged himself in a certain sum for its performance, admitted that, "if a covenant had been for ^^30. then debt only lies ; but here it is to perform an agreement."^ Precisely when the Common Bench adopted the practice of the King's Bench it is, perhaps, impossible to discover; but the change was probably effected before the end of the reign of Charles I.

That Covenant became concurrent with Debt on a specialty so many years after Assumpsit was allowed as a substitute for Debt on a simple contract, was doubtless due to the fact that there was no wager of law in Debt on a sealed obligation.

Although the right to a trial by jury was the principal reason for a creditor's preference for Indebitatus Assumpsit, the new action very soon gave plaintiffs a privilege which must have con- tributed greatly to its popularity. In declaring in Debt, except possibly upon an account stated, the plaintiff was required to set forth his cause of action with great particularity. Thus, the count in Debt must state the quantity and description of goods sold, with the details of the price, all the particulars of a loan, the names of the persons to whom money was paid with the amounts of each payment, the names of the persons from whom money was re- ceived to the use of the plaintiff with the amounts of each receipt, the precise nature and amount of services rendered. In Indebi- tatus Assumpsit, on the other hand, the debt being laid as an in- ducement or conveyance to the assumpsit, it was not necessary to set forth all the details of the transaction from which it arose. It was enough to allege the general nature of the indebtedness, as for goods sold,^ money lent,* money paid at the defendant's request,* money had and received to the plaintiff's use,* work and labor at the defendant's request,® or upon an account stated,^ and that the

��1 Brown v. Hancock, Hetl. 110, iii.

Jac. 206; Gardiner v, Bellingham (1612), Hob. 5, i Roll. R. 24, s. c.
 * Hughes V, Rowbotham (1592), Poph. 30, 31 ; Woodford v. Deacon (1608), Cro.

« Rooke V. Rooke (i6jo), Cro. Jac. 245, Yelv. 175, s. c.


 * Rooke V. Rooke, supra; Moore v. Moore {161 1), i Bulst. 169.


 * Babington v. Lambert (1616), Moore, 854.

« Russell V, Collins (1669), 1 Sid. 425, i Mod. 8, 1 Vent. 44, 2 Keb. 552, s. c.

7 Brinsley r. Partridge (161 1), Hob. 88 ; Vale v. Egles (1605), Yelv. 70, Cro. Jac. 69.