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 Rh, is necessary, in order to make out the wrongful act. The same idea is expressed in a Massachusetts case, brought upon a cause of action similar to that in Lumley v. Gye. The declaration set forth intentional and wilful acts, done with the unlawful purpose to cause damage to the plaintiff, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant; “which,” says Mr. Justice Wells, “constitutes malice.” Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562.

It is in this aspect that the case of Lumley v. Gye is most interesting. It is a conspicuous example of an action on the case for a tort, in which malice is declared to be an essential element.

In Lumley v. Gye the judges apparently limited the principle to the case of contracts for exclusive personal service. In Bowen v. Hall the contract which the defendant had procured to be broken was a contract for such service; but the reasoning of the court was not confined to that class of cases, and was in no manner restricted, except by the statement that the question presented by the case was whether the decision in Lumley v. Gye should be affirmed or reversed. As the principle was stated and combated by Coleridge, J., and as it was elaborated by the Court of Appeal, in Bowen v. Hall, it embraced the whole field of contract. If it is a tort maliciously to procure the breach of a contract for exclusive personal service, why is it not a tort maliciously to procure the breach of any contract? All that the plaintiff is obliged to prove is a wrongful act, and damage. To procure the breach of a contract of sale is a damage in the same manner as to procure the breach of a contract of service. Why is it not equally a wrongful act? It may be said that, for reasons of policy, contracts for personal service should receive extraordinary protection, especially in the case of persons employed on account of their talents or peculiar skill, because the loss of the contract cannot be made good to the employer. But similar considerations can readily be suggested in the case of many other contracts, and they afford a very uncertain ground upon which to limit the application of the rule. If the case of Lumley v. Gye is to rest upon the principle stated in Bowen v. Hall, consistency requires that it should be extended to the breach of any contract. In one case, at least, it has been so applied.