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288 shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, as the act must be read with the Constitution, and it must be assumed the courts will not award process of condemnation unless compensation be provided for. In re Rugheimer, 36 Fed. Rep. 369 (S. C).

— Ex Post Facto Laws — Act Void in Part. — The rule laid down in Cooley's Const Lim. (5th ed.) 215, that "a general law for the punishment of offences, which should endeavor to reach, by its retroactive operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribe a rule of conduct for the citizen in future, would be void so far as it was retrospective; but such invalidity would not affect the operation of the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative control," is cited as the ratio decidendi in Jaehne v. People of New York, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 70; s. c. 16 Wash. L. Rep, 763.

— An act of the Massachusetts Legislature, providing that the police of the city of Boston shall be put under the control and management of a board of police appointed by the Governor of the State, is a constitutional exercise of legislative power. Under the State Constitution giving the Legislature power to establish a municipal government in any city or town, to grant privileges and immunities to its citizens, and to pass all laws the Legislature judges to be for the "good and welfare" of the Commonwealth, "the powers and duties of all the towns and cities, except so far as they are specifically provided for in the Constitution, are created and defined by the Legislature," and subject to its control. The act in question violates no provision of the Constitution, and the court "cannot declare an act of the Legislature invalid because it abridges the exercise of the privilege of local self-government in a particular in regard to which such privilege is not guaranteed by any provision in the Constitution." Com. V. Plaisted, Mass. Sup. Ct. Rescript of Jan. 6, 1889.

See Cooley's note on "Local Self-Government," 1 Story on the Constitution, 4th ed. § 280, the general tendency of which is in conflict with the doctrine of Com. V. Plaisied, So long, it is said, as municipal corporations for local self, government exist, "though the State may lay down rules for the regulation of their affairs and the management of their property, it is nevertheless a part of the right of self-government that the people concerned should choose their own officers who are to administer such rules and have the care of such property, and the State cannot appoint such officers, as it might those who are to perform duties of a more general nature for the public at large." Ibid., p. 197, and cases cited.

— A suit will lie by the United States government in the United States Circuit Courts to set aside a patent for an invention, on the ground that it has been obtained by fraud. The analogous cases establishing that the United States government has the right to bring suit in its own courts to set aside land patents issued by the government, obtained by the fraud of the patentee, rest either upon the ground that the government has a direct pecuniary interest in the result, or that it is under an obligation to bring the suit, either to an individual who will be thereby benefited, or to the public. "The essence of the right of the United States to interfere in the present case is its obligation to protect the public from the monopoly of the patent which was procured by fraud." United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; s. c. 38 Alb. L J. 473.

— A statute which extends the jurisdiction of a court of equity to quiet titles to cases where the lands are unoccupied is not unconstitutional as depriving the defendant of the right to trial by jury secured by the Constitution, for such constitutional provision extends only to cases where the common-law trial by jury was customary, and at common law ejectment did not lie where defendant was not in possession. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Sparrow, 36 Fed. Rep. 210 (Mich.).

— A statute of the United States gave the United States the right to sue in tort for the cutting of certain timber on public lands. Under this statute a cause of action accrued against defendant, but no suit was brought until after the statute was repealed. Held (semble) that the repeal of the statute did not take away this right to sue defendant in tort, for defendant's obligation might be