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any authority in favor of this view. The decisions of Gibbons v- Ogden and Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.^ do not fairly support such a doctrine. The other cases cited in its sup- port are explainable as cases of either only colorable police regu- lations, or of regulations of commerce by the States, permissible in the absence of congressional regulations. Recent decisions expressly reject the proposed test. In Henderson v. Mayer of New York, the court declare that "in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect." ^ This language is quoted and applied by the court in Railroad Co. v, Husen,® holding unconstitutional a statute clearly intended by the Legislature to be a health law. To the same effect is Morgan v, Louisiana,* citing other cases. The court has not hesitated to go into the mode of the actual adminis- tration of the law to determine the constitutionality of the rule enforced in a particular case.^ Furthermore, the test suggested does not seem to be a very helpful one. How is the object of the Legislature in passing a law to be determined .? To answer this question one is compelled to examine the effect and operation of the law. Mr. Greely himself is driven to resort to this method in order to save the rule he proposes from the effect of recent decis- ions.® It is no great advance to say that we are to look at the object, not the operation, of the law to decide whether it is a regu- lation of commerce, and then resort to the operation of the law to determine what was its object. It is simpler and more consistent with the authorities to ask directly, Does the law operate as a regu- lation of commerce }

Blewett H, Lee. Leipzig.

[ To be contiuutJ, ]

1 2 Pet. 245 (1877). * 92 U. S. 259, 268 (1875).

•95 U. S.465, 472(1877)- * 118U. S,455, 462 (1886).

» Yick Wo V, Hopkinf, 118 U. S. 256, 373 (1886). « I Harv. L. Rer. 179.