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 Rh, was against the action; Cockayne, J., favored it. Babington, C. J., at first agreed with Cockayne, J., but was evidently shaken by the remark of Martin, J.: “Truly, if this action is maintained, one shall have trespass for breach of any covenant in the world,” for he then said: “Our talk is idle, for they have not demurred in judgment. Plead and say what you will, or demur, and then it can be debated and disputed at leisure.” The case went off on another point. Martin, J., appears finally to have won over the Chief Justice to his view, for, eight years later, we find Babington, C. J., Martin and Cotesmore, JJ., agreeing in a dictum that no action will lie for the breach of a parol promise to buy a manor. Paston, J., showed an inclination to allow the action. In 1435 he gave effect to this inclination, holding, with Juyn, J., that the defendant was liable in an action on the case for the breach of a parol promise to procure certain releases for the plaintiff. But this decision was ineffectual to change the law. Made without a precedent, it has had no following. The doctrine laid down in the time of Henry IV. has been repeatedly reaffirmed.

The remaining actions on the case for deceit before mentioned may now be considered. In the first of these cases the writ is