Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/285

 QUARANTINE LAWS. 267

tion issues, or of which the attorney is an officer, which renders an action or suit against either seldom necessary. Moreover, if an action or suit is to be brought, an action of indebitatus assump- sit will generally be more convenient than a suit in equity ; and to render such an action available, it seems only necessary for the plaintiff to make a demand before suing.

A stakeholder is clearly not entitled to debit himself with the stakes received by him, and therefore he is accountable for them; ^ and, though here also an action of indebitattis assumpsit will gen- erally be more convenient than a bill for an account, yet a pre- vious demand ought to be a necessary condition of maintaining such an action.

C, C. LangdelL

Cambridge.

[ To be continued^

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE FEDERAL CON- STITUTION ON THE RIGHT OF THE STATES TO ENACT QUARANTINE LAWS.

I.

THE subject will be treated in the following order : — (I.) The nature of quarantine laws, and their classifica- tion in our constitutional law. This involves

(2.) The nature of the police power, and its distribution in our system of government.

(3.) The limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the police power of the States, applicable to quarantine laws. Under this head will be considered the effect of the power of Congress to regulate commerce ; upon the rights of the States to enact these laws ; when State quarantine regulations become unconstitutional on account of the scope of their provisions, or the purposes of their enactment ; and, lastly, the effect of quarantine legislation by Congress, and the actual legislation of Congress upon this subject.

The term " quarantine " is derived through the monkish Latin

1 Baynton v. Cheek, Styles, 353.