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Rh plaintiff is merely speculating and those where he intends really to hold the stock as owner.

The case above repudiates that distinction. It is an illustration of the modern tendency to requiire a plaintiff so to act as to make his damages as small as he reasonably can, both in actions of tort (Hoggle V. R. R. Co., 28 Hun, 363) and of contract (Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92). See 1 Sedgwick on Damages (7th ed.), 166, note.

— Although a presumption of death arises at the end of a seven years' absence, there is no presumption of life during that period, or of the time of death; the time of death, when material, is a fact to be established by evidence. Whitely v. ''Equitable Life Assur. Soc''. of U. S., 39 N. W. Rep. 369 (Wis.).

For other cases overthrowing the old doctrine that there is a presumption of life until the end of the seven years, see Bailey v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, at 634, and note in Best's Evidence (Chamberlayne's ed.), p. 299.

— Where community property conveyed to secure the husband's debt is, upon payment of the debt, reconveyed to the wife upon a nominal consideration, it again becomes community property, as it was originally. Ballew v. Casey, 9 S W. Rep. 189 (Tex.).

— The plaintiff applied for insurance, and the agent, unable to determine what should be the premium until the property was rated, gave a "binding receipt," which certified that the company would hold good a specified amount of insurance until the policy could be delivered. No premium was ever paid, and nothing more was done about the matter until about ten months afterward, when a loss occurred. Held, that the "binding receipt" was a mere preliminary contract, and continued onily for a reasonable time; and that ten months was not a reasonable time in case of a contract for one year. Coe v. ''Washington F. & AM. Ins. Co.,'' 17 Ins. L. J. 717 (N. J. Circuit Court.)

— Although the use of leased premises as a hospital for the cure of diseases of the ear, etc., in which known infectious diseases are not treated, is not a breach of a covenant not to use the premises to the "nuisance" of adjoining residents, such a use not being a technical "nuisance," yet it is a breach of a covenant not to use the premises to the "annoyance" of adjoining residents, being such a use of the premises as seriously abridges their ordinary comfort of existence, and sensibly increases the possible danger from infection. Heeatley v. Benham, 59 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 25; S. C. 38 Alb. L. J. 321.

— Directors of a tramway company, who issue a prospectus stating that under its act of incorporation the company has the right to use steam-power instead of horse-power, when in fact the company has only the right to use steam-power with the consent of the board of trade, which consent was afterwards refused, are liable, in an action of deceit, to a stockholder to whom this misstatement was a material inducement for taking shares in the company, to the extent of the actual loss which he sustained through depreciation in the value of the shares subsequent to his purchase. Cotton, L. J.: "Where a man makes a statement, to be acted upon by others, which is false, and which is known by him to be false, or is made by him recklessly or without caring whether it is true or false — that is, without any reasonable ground for believing it to be true — he is liable in an action of deceit at the suit of any one to whom it was addressed, or of any one of the class to whom it was addressed, and who was materially induced by the misstatements to do an act to his prejudice." Peek v. Derry, 59 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 78; s. c. 38 Alb. L. J. 273.

This is a strong and important decision, insisting more strongly than has ever been done before on the necessity of strictest honesty in commercial dealings. It was also held in this case that a director who was not present at the meeting at which the issuing of the prospectus was authorized, but who afterwards received and circulated some copies of it, had adopted it, and was liable to the stockholder, although the copy seen by the stockholder had not been supplied by him.

— A child four and one-half years old was run over and killed through the negligence of the driver of a loaded wagon. Held, that the father could recover all the probable, or even