Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/119

 RECENT CASES. lOI

of plaintiff, indemnified defendant by giving him a chattel mortgage on certain property. Plaintiff then, without consideration, released C from liability on the note. Afterwards, defendant sold his security without consent of plaintiff. Held, in an action on the note, that, notwithstanding the release of the principal debtor, the defendant, having been indemnified to the full amount of the note, was liable. Jottes V. IVard, 36 K W. Rep. (Wis.).

Promissory Note — Fraudulent — Purchaser for Value. — Where a note procured by fraud has been purchased before maturity, in good faith, with- out notice of such fraud, at a discount, the purchaser may recover the full amount of the note against the maker. — Wiiliams v. Huntiugton, 16 Wash. L. Rep. 233 (Md.).

The decision repudiates the rule laid down in i Dan. Neg. Inst., sec. 758, that the purchaser can only recover the amount paid for the note. The case also decides that the purchase of a note at a heavy discount, and the existence of circumstances calculated to excite suspicion, do not of themselves show want of good faith in the purchaser; actual bad faith must be proved.

Statute of Frauds — Sale of Land — Continuing Possession. — Where, after a sale of land, the vendee orally agrees for a valuable consideration to allow the vendor to retain possession of the land as if no sale had been made, and to release all his title, held, that the vendor's possession subsequent to the agreement is not simply a continuance of his prior possession, but must be referred to the contract, and takes the oral agreement out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. Simmons v. Headlee, 7 S. W. Rep. 20 (Mo.).

Statute of Frauds — Sale of Land — Joint Possession of Grantor AND Grantee. — The ])laintiff having made an oral contract with the defendant for the conveyance of land, paid the purchase-money, and lived on the land to- gether with the defendant. Held^ that possession by the plaintiff which is not exclusive is not sufficient performance under the contract to entitle him to a decree of conveyance. Gallagher v. Gallaghtr, 5 S. E. R. 297 (W. Va.); see, also, Pitt V. Moore, 5 S. E. R. 389 (N. C).

Statute of Limitations — Concealment of a Will.— A, interested in the non-production of a will, fraudulently concealed it. Held, that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run as to probating the will until after the dis- covery of the will, provided reasonable diligence was used in its discovery. Appeal of Drake, 17 Atl. Rep. 790 (Me.).

That fraudulent concealment ot a tort is not a good replication to a plea of the Statute of Limitations, see Langdell's Summary of Equity Pleading (2d ed.), 128.

Subrogation — Voluntary Payment of Debt. — The town of Middleport, in pursuance of a statute of Illinois, voted an appropriation to a railroad com- pany, and to raise the money issued bonds payable to bearer, which were de- livered to the company, and j»urchased from it \yj the plaintiff. It turned out that the bonds were void. The plaintiff then claimed to be subrogated to any rights the company might have to enforce payment of the appropriation, on the ground that the purchase of the bonds operated as a payment of a debt due the company from the town. Held, that the purchase had no effect on the debt. The plaintiff bought the bonds because of the discount and interest, not to extinguish a debt. Besides, even if there was a payment of the debt, it was purely voluntary, while a person seeking subrogation must have paid the debt under some necessity. jEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625.

Term of Injunction — Effect of Appeal. — Where an injunction is by its terms limited to remain in force "only until the hearing" of a case, it was held that the injunction is ipso facto dissolved by a judgment rendered in the case, and is not continued in force by the taking of an appeal. Fort IVorth St. Ry. Co. v. Rosedale St. Ry. Co., 7 S. W. Rep. 381 (Tex.).

Trust — Grounds for Removal of Trustee. — Under the terms of the will creating the trust, the trustees were to pay to the plaintiff, in the exercise of their discretion, such portion of the income, "or no portion at all thereof, as they shall from time to time think fitting and proper." A state of hostility, attribu- table in part to the fault of the trustee, arose between the plaintiff and a trustee. No misconduct in the performance of the trust was shown. Held, the court will remove the trustee, for the removal appears essential to the interests of the cestui. Wilson v. Wilson, 14 N. E. Rep. 521 (Mass.).