Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/115

 RECENT CASES. 97

Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce. — A statute of Indiana re- quired every sleeping-car company incorporated under the laws of another Slate, and doing any business in Indiana, to pay a certain tax, based upon the proportional part of the gross receipts due to the business done within the State, //e/i/^ unconsti- tutional, because a tax upon interstate commerce. SttUf v. Woodruffs S, S* P. Coach Co., 15 N. £. Rep. 814 (Ind.).

The late decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court are referred to as carrying the power of the United States over interstate commerce to the fullest extent, even to annulling the police power of the States where interstate commerce is con- cerned. See Robbins v. Taxing Disi.^ 120 U. S. 489, digested in i Harv. L. Rev. 108.

CoNSTiTirrioNAL Law — Intoxicating Liquors — • Regulation of Com- merce. — An Iowa statute forbidding any common carrier to bring within the State any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory without first being fur- nished with a certificate from the auditor of the- county to which such liquor is to be transported, certifying that the consignee is a person authorized to sell intoxicating liquors, is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. Waite, C. J., Gray and Harlan, J J., dissenting. Bowman v. Chicago 6* N. W. Ry, Co,^ 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689.

Constitutional Law — Prohibitory Liquor Law. — A statute which pro- vides that no person shall manufacture, or keep on his premises, any intoxicating liquors for the purpose of sale, is not rendered void as an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce, because the prohibition would cover the case of liquor kept for the purpose of sale without the State. State v. Fittpatrick^ 37 Alb. L. Jour. 290 (R. L).

Contract — Right of Beneficiary to Sue. — Where a contract is entered into for the benefit of the third party, he can sue the promisor in his own name. Hostetter\. Hollinger, 12 Atl. Rep. 741 (Pa.).

But where the promise is made for the benefit of the promisee, e. g., a promise to pay the debt of another, in which case the promise is for the benefit of the debtor, the third party cannot sue. Austin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. Rep. 519.

Copyright — Extracts from Book. — Defendant published a pamphlet which contained about one hundred short extracts taken from complainant's book. Bill for injunction. ffeU^ that if extracts had been scattered through defendant's book, so that it would be impossible to separate them from the original matter, it would be proper to apply the doctrine of confusion of goods, and enjoin the whole book ; but as three-fourths of the extracts from complainant's book — and practically all to which he could lay claim as original matter — were contained in the first chapter, being the first eleven pages of the pamphlet, the injunction should extend only to this portion of the publication. Farmer v. Elstner^ 53 Fed. Rep. 494 (Mich.).

Deed— -Fraud in Obtaining Delivery — Bona Fide Purchasers. — Where the grantor of land executed a deed, and before payment of the purchase-money

E laced the deed in the grantee's possession, upon the fraudulent representation that e wanted it to copy field-notes of the land, held^ that this did not operate as a de- livery of the deed, and passed no title, and that one who, without knowledge, subse- quently took a deed from the grantee for a valuable consideration, could not be held a purchaser for value as against the original grantor. Steffian v. Milmo Nat. Bank. 6 S. W. Rep. 823 (Tex.).

This would seem to be a suitable case for the application of the doctrine of estop- pel ; the numerous authorities cited by the Court scarcely bear out their proposition ; many of them are cases of deeds given in escrow.

Deed — Mistake in Description— Parol Evidence to Explain. — In an action of trespass to try title between the respective grantees of R and S, the two parties to a deed, held, that evidence was inadmissible to show that the descriptive words in the deed were improperly used, and that other land than that described was intended to have been conveyed. Such evidence would have been admissible had the controversy been between R and S ; but " vendees of S, in the absence of knowledge that a mistake in the description of the land intended to be conveyed by R to S had been made in the deed, if a mistake in this respect occurred, were entitled to rely on the description contained in the deed." Farley v. Deslande. 6 S. W. Rep.

786 (t«.).