Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/81

61 RECENT CASES. 6 1 tract." The phrase seems to be used in the sense of an obligation imposed by law to paychecks when presented, — a quasi-contractual rather than a contractual obligation. This must be imppsed because such is the general custom and understanding of the commercial community, and upon this the Illinois court rests its decisions. It is believed, however, that the commercial understanding is that banks are under a duty to no one but the drawer to pay checks, and to him solely by virtue of the con- tract of deposit ; and certainly that there is no other legal obligation where, as in the principal case, payment is ordered stopped by the drawer. On the general question the authorities are about evenly divided. See 2 Morse, Banks, § 490 et seq. Carriers — Wrong Ticket— Ejection. — Plaintiff requested and paid for a ticket to A. The ticket agent through mistake gave her a ticket to B, which she pre- sented to the conductor with proper explanations. She was ejected for not paying fare to A. Held, that the company is liable. Ala. dr" Vicksburg Ry, Co. v. Holmes, 23 So. Rep. 187 (Miss.). '1 he case follows an earlier decision in the same State, K. S., M. <2r» B. R. R. Co, V. Riley, 68 Miss. 765, which is put upon the ground that any regulation of the carrier requiring the conductor to eject a passenger under the above circumstances is unreasonable. This is contrary to the great weight of authority and seems unsound. Biadshaw v. So. Boston R. R. Co., 135 Mass. 407. It is generally held that as between passenger and conductor the face of the ticket is conclusive evidence of the passenger's right to carriage. Frederick v. M. H. iSr' O. R. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342. This rule is frequently rested upon the practical reason that a proper regard for the con- venience of passengers and the security of the company in collecting fares makes it impracticable for the conductor to regard other evidence of the passenger's right to carriage than his ticket. But there seems to be a more substantial ground on which to support these cases. The ticket is itself the only contract of carriage, and the passenger cannot complain because he is not carried to some other destination than that specified in his contract. 9 Harv. Law Rev. 353. Constitutional Law — Additional Servitude — Electric Railroads — Held, that the construction of an electric railroad, with poles and overhead wires, imposes an additional servitude, not consistent with the purposes for which a street is dedicated. Jaynes v. Omaha Street Railway Co, 74 N. W. Rep. 67 (Neb.). There is much conflict on the question of what uses may properly be considered to be within the original dedication of a highway to the public. Some courts have held that nothing is granted but the bare right of passage over the surface; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 696 ; others, that there is a general right of inter-commu- nication. Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75. As to modes of conveyance over the surface, the true view seems to be, that it makes no difference what the motive power is, nor whether acquired from above or below, so long as the road is fairly and substantially usable as a highway. Tagsfart v. Nervport Street Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 668 ; Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Ry. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380. In the principal case, while the court seems to agree with this test, it finds as a matter of fact that a trolley road interferes with the substantial use of the highway. Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment — Eight-Hour Laws. — Held, that a State statute forbidding the employment of workingmen for more than eight hours per day in mines and smelting-works is a valid police regulation for the protection of health, and not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holden v. Hardy, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. It was argued that there was a deprivation of property without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws in that the contracting power of a cer- tain class of employers and laborers was limited by the statute. The decision in effect reaffirms the conservative construction of the term " property " which has been cus- tomary in the decisions of the Supreme Court. The case, therefore, is important in view of the tendency in some State courts to construe the terms " liberty " and " prop- erty " very broadly, and under cover of these terms to deny the validity of paternal leg- islation. Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; Braceville Coal Co. v. The People, 147 111. 66; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307. Paternalism is often very objectionable, but it is clearly a matter of policy. The opinion in the principal case also shows clearly that legislation is a progressive science, which can be satisfactorily developed only with the aid of experiments. It is not the province of the courts under our constitutions to stand in the way of these experiments. For an admirable discussion of this subject, see the dissenting opinion of Barclay, J., in State v. Loomis, supra. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Evidence. — A statute of Virginia provides that a common carrier accepting goods for transportation to a point