Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/80

60 6o HARVARD LAW REVIEW. The style is clear and flowing, drawing illustrations from the sources to which the author's scholarship gave him access. It is in striking contrast with Marshall's intensely focussed style ; but it is none the less clear, and it has a richness which Marshall's lacks. The books have laid the foun- dations of an international reputation ; and it was owing to them that Lord Campbell in the House of Lords in 1847 spoke of Story as "greater than any law writer of which England could boast, or which she could bring forward since the days of Blackstone." RECENT CASES. Bills and Notes — Alteratiox — Estoppel by Negligence. — H desiring to borrow money through her agent, signed a note for $500, written with a lead pencil. The agent raised the note to $1,200, and sold it for that amount to plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser. Held, that H is liable for $500 only. Walsh v. Hutit, 52 Pac. Rep. 115 (Cal., Sup. Ct.). This case must be added to the increasing line of cases contra to the doctrine of Young V. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, that one who facilitates, by careless execution, the alteration of a negotiable instrument is liable to an innocent purchaser for the amount of the instrument in its altered form. This doctrine, which rests upon estoppel by negli- gence, appears to be the better view, and more consistent with the conception of a negotiable instrument. These instruments are intended to pass freely from hand to hand, and the principal case tends to interfere with their free circulation. See 10 Harv. Law Rev. 185. Bills and Notes — Conditional Delivery. — The makerof a note delivered it to the payee's agent on condition that it was not to take effect until signed by X, but the latter's signature was never obtained. Held, that these facts cannot be set up in defence in an action by the payee against the maker. Hurt v. Ford, 44 S. W. Rep. 228 (Mo.). There is an almost hopeless conflict of authority as to whether there can be a con- ditional delivery of a note to the payee or his agent. Some courts have followed the strict rule as to deeds, that delivery in escrow can be made only to a stranger, while others have reached the same result by applying the parol evidence rule. Stewart v Anderson, 59 Ind. 375 ; Mossman v. Holscher, 49 Mo. 87. In England and in most of the jurisdictions in this country in which the question has arisen the courts have consistently applied to negotiable instruments the doctrine of Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. & B. 370, that the jjarol evidence in such a case does not tend to vary an existing written contract, but shows that no contract ever existed unless the contingency occurred upon which it was to take effect, and that therefore the parol evidence rule has no application. The old rule as to deeds is technical and should not be extended. Mer- chants, etc. Bank v. Luckow, 37 Minn. 542; Alexander v. Walker, 11 Lea, 221 ; Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228. Of course if the note has come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the maker should be estopped to deny a valid delivery to the payee. Bills and Notes — Checks — Refusal of Payment. — A check was drawn on a bank where there were not sufficient funds to meet it. The drawer ordered payment stopped, but later increased his deposit above the amount of the check. Held, that the bank is liable to the holder for a subsequent refusal to honor although the order of the drawer had not been countermanded. A bank upon receipt of a deposit agrees " with the whole world " to honor presented checks if there are sufficient funds, and a secret understanding with the depositor is no defence to the holder's rights. Gage Hotel Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 49 N. E. Rep. 420 (111.). The Illinois cases have affirmed the right of a check-holder to compel payment by a bank on two grounds: first, that a check is an assignment /r^? A/w/^ of the deposit; see II Harv. Law Rev. 548 for an adverse criticism of a late Illinois case taking this view ; second, the ground of " implied contract " taken in the principal case. A check is an assignment when dravvn, if at all. Since at that time there were not sufficient fuids to meet it, the principal case, if sound, must be rested on tiie theory of "implied con-