Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/583

563 NOTES. 563 prisoner was informed that his infant daughter had been ravished, some weeks before, by his son-in-law. He went to the house of the ravisher and demanded an explanation. When the latter answered him defiantly, the father shot twice and killed him. Here was clear *' cooling lime," and no further provocation save the defiant reply, but it was finally held that all the facts should have gone to the jury on the general question of reasonable provocation. 'I'he opinion of the court is clear and convincing ; it is supported by a few strong modern cases, notably Mayor . People, lo Mich. 212, and Peg. V. Rothwellt 12 Cox C C 145. The authority against the decision practically reduces to a number of dicta which reiterate the formula, " mere words are not a provocation," and exemplify a legal habit of de- pending on unconsidered maxims ; but the point seems to have been directly raised only in Reg. v. Rothwell, supra. Few will disagree with the result of the principal case. It is for just such a case that the ar- bitrary mechanical rule of the old law is obviously unfit. Here the mere words were but the " last straw," the crowning taunt ; to treat them as a separate species of provocation and make a separate rule about them is irrational, — more, it is belittling the intelligence of the jury. And surely it is most important for the dignity of the law that, in regard to the most serious and notorious of crimes, its judgment should keep step with public opinion. Revocation of Agency by Death of the Principal. — By the civil law all acts of an agent performed within the scope of his authority before he has notice of the death of his principal are binding on the deceased's estate. But at the common law the opposite rule prevails, both in Eng- and and in America. And the cases hold that the death of the principal creates an instantaneous revocation of authority, unless the power of attorney be coupled with an interest. Davis v. Windsor Savings Bank^ 46 Vt. 728 ; The Farmers' Loan &* Trust Co., 139 N. Y. 284. Deweese v. Muff, reported in The Central Law Journal, Feb. 30, 1899, seems to attempt to fasten an exception on this general rule. The payee of a note indorsed it in blank, and gave it to his agent for collection. In ignorance of the subsequent death of the principal, the maker paid to the agent a balance due on the note. The representative of the payee repu- diated this payment on the ground that the authority to collect had been revoked by death, and sought to recharge the maker. The Supreme Court of Nebraska sustained a peremptory instruction to return a verdict for the defendant. It reasoned correctly enough that, as the note was properly indorsed by the payee, it was not necessary for the agent to collect or receive money in his principal's name. The maker would clearly be protected after payment to any one who came within the tenor of the promise. But apart from the law of negotiable paper, the court added this further discussion. AUhough, it said, as a general rule the death of a principal instantly terminates the agency, still, where one in good faith deals with an agent in ignorance of the death of the principal, the representatives are bound if the act done is not required to be per- formed in the principal's name. This dictum is interesting as showing an attempt to break away to a certain extent from the rigorous principle of the common law which un- questionably often works hardship. It may be reasoned that the general 73