Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/48

28 28 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. pending in a Federal court sitting within the State is as completely- operative in respect of title to land within the State as a suit in a State court; but State statutes cannot force a Federal lien upon the State records j^ and it would seem, by parity of reasoning, that they cannot so affect any form of priority having its foundation in the Federal Constitution and laws. Undoubtedly such classes of Federal liens as are mere matter of procedure at law (as, the lien of mesne attachment, in an action at law, under the Massachusetts practice), may be, and in the Massachusetts district, at least, are, provided for by rule of the Federal court, requiring notice upon the State records, as in the State practice; but this courtesy, however far it may be carried in respect of actions at law, has no place in the Federal equity procedure in respect of lis pendens. The writer has never known of systematic precaution against such Federal suits. In Massachusetts, certainly, the question of the possible existence of such a priority is, as a rule, left to chance. There is a further possible operation of lis pendens. It is by no means clear that it has not an extra-territorial operation, from one State into another. The reason of the rule of lis pendens seems to require a disregard of State lines ; and it has been more than once held — without, however, any discussion of a possible limiting effect of a lis pendens notice statute — that a suit pending in one State has such extra-territorial operation in another State.^ It is possible that a State statute requiring record notice of a pending .suit may operate against a suit in a court of another State. The ordinary form of statute of this class, however, would perhaps not be construed to intend such an operation ; and, moreover, the extra-territorial force of a judicial proceeding of a State stands upon the Federal Constitution as truly as does a Federal lien, such as was in question in United States v. Snyder ; and it well may, therefore, like such a Federal lien, be within the principle of United States v. Snyder, and thus not subject to control by a State recording statute. It is not the object of this article to argue unsettled questions ; but it is proper to point out that the doctrine of lis pendens offers, in respect of many Federal suits, and perhaps in respect of suits in other States and in other Federal districts, at least a possibility of defect, in every title, as serious as many a possibility against which a conveyancer provides with minute care. 1 United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210. 2 Bennett, Lis Pendens, § 83 ; "Territorial Extent of Lis Pendens," and cas. cit.