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352 352 - HARVARD LAW REVIEW. not contained in the former act, that the law should go into full force and effect upon its passage. This clause is taken to indicate the intention of Congress that the law should go into general operation before proceedings could be commenced under it. Since every law becomes operative upon its oassage, the declaration in the present act that it should at once have full force and effect would be entirely meaningless unless this construction is adopted. The case is liiiely to be followed in other jurisdictions. Bills and Notes — Forged Indorskmknts. — The drawer of a check handed it to A. to deliver to the payee. A., however, forged the name of the payee and made delivery to the defendant, who took for value and without notice of the forgery. In like ignorance the plaintiff, the drawee, then paid the amount of the check to the defendant. In an action to recover back the amount paid, held, that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. First National Bank v. Farmers' ^ Merchants^ Bank, 76 N. W. Rep. 430 (Neb.). See Notes. Bills and Notes — Transfer — Notice. — The defendant made a promissory note but had a personal equitable defence to any action thereon by the payee. The payee then indorsed the note to the plaintiff. Held, that the defence is not available against the plaintiff if he received the note in good faith, though he had sufficient notice to put a reasonable man upon inquiry. Mulberger v. Morgan, 47 S. W. Rep. 379 (Tex., Civ. App.) ; Lehman v. Press, 76 N. W. Rep. 818 (Iowa). The cases are in agreement with the great majority of decisions and express the better view. See 12 Harv. Law Rev. 213. Constitutional Law — Anti-Trust Act. — Held, that the United States Anti- Trust Act is constitutional and prohibits any combination among competing railroad companies engaged in interstate commerce to establish and maintain rates, whether the rates are unreasonable or not. United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25. In construing the statute the opinion reaffirms the doctrine of U. S. v. Trans- Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290; II Harv. Law Rev. 51, 126. See Prentice and Egan, Commerce Clause, 317. It also carefully limits its application to contracts, the direct and immediate effect of which is to restrain interstate commerce. Compare Hopkins v. U. S., 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; 12 Harv. Law Rev. 278 ; Andersons. U. S., 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. The case is especially noteworthy, however, as deciding for the first time the constitutionality of the statute as previously interpreted. There is great differ- ence of opinion on the point, but the decision is probably correct. The act is author- ized by the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, unless it is forbidden by the fifth constitutional amendment as depriving persons of liberty without due process of law. However " liberty " is construed, the statute is valid unless it is not due process of law, and it is hardly oppressive and arbitrary enough to be held void on that ground. The prohibition of agreements thought to be dangerous to public welfare has been common in legislation from the earliest times ; if Congress deem it advisable to forbid all combinations to fix interstate commerce charges in order to prevent those combinations which are injurious, the courts are not called upon to interfere. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678. See 11 Harv. Law Rev. So. ' Constitutional Law — Criminal Liability — Acts done under an Uncon- stitutional Statute. — A statute repealed a law which imposed upon the defendants, who were public officers, a certain duty, the neglect of which was criminal. Held, that the defendants are not indictable for the neglect of such duty, if they relied upon the repealing statute, bona fide believing it to be constitutional, although it was after- wards declared unconstitutional by the courts. State v. Godwin,^ S. E. Rep. 221 (n. c). The case seems to be correct on principle, although there is a direct conflict of authority on the question. Many jurisdictions hold that when a legislative enactment proves to be invalid, it is, for all legal purposes, as if it had never existed; and, before it has been declared unconstitutional by the courts, acts done or duties neglected by a public officer, bona fide believing it to be valid and in reliance upon it, are, according to the general rule, not excused by his ignorance of the law. Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 ; Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103. The better and more just doctrine, how- ever, appears to be that the officer is protected unless the statute relied upon appears on its face clearly unconstitutional. Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378 ; Sessums v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Anti-Trust Act. — Appel- lants were members of the Kansas City Stock Exchange, a combination of commission merchants engaged in selling on commission the live stock received at the stockyards of Kansas City. They drew up rules limiting rates to be charged, and further regu- lating the business. Held, that this combination is not a restraint of trade within the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, since it does not directly concern interstate commerce. Hopkins v. United States, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40. See Notes, 12 Harv. Law Rev. 278.