Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/347

327 MASSACHUSETTS AS A PHILANTHROPIC ROBBER. 327 taxpayers. The Constitution of Massachusetts says, Part IL, chap- ter I, section i, article 4: — "The General Court has power to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes . . . to be issued and disposed of by warrant ... for the public service in the necessary defence and support of the government of the said Commonwealth and the protection and preservation of the subjects thereof according to such acts as are or shall be in force within the same." The courts of the Commonwealth have been assiduous in their care of the citizen against improper expenditure of public moneys. The courts have time and time again laid down the proposition that taxation must be for public purposes only ; and that the public funds must not be expended for the benefit of private individuals, no matter how praiseworthy in motive or how advantageous to the State such an expenditure might be. In Lowell v. Boston,^ in 1872, the court was called upon to de- cide whether the Legislature could authorize the city of Boston to loan money to property owners burned out in the great Boston fire. It was decided that the Legislature had no power to allow such expenditure of moneys raised by taxation, and it was said; — "The power to levy taxes is founded on the right, duty, and responsi- bility to maintain and administer all the governmental functions of the State, and to provide for the public welfare. To justify any exercise of the power requires that the expenditure which it is intended to meet shall be for some public services, or some object which concerns the pub- lic welfare. The promotion of the interests of individuals, either in re- spect of property or business, although it may result incidentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and not a public object. However certain and great the resulting good to the general public, it does not, by reason of its comparative importance, cease to be incidental. The incidental advantage to the public, or to the State, which results from the promotion of private interests, and the pros- perity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may become necessary." And in Kingman v. Brockton ^ the Court said that : — "It is necessary to recur and to adhere firmly to fundamental prin- ciples. The right of taxation by a city or town extends only to raising money for public purposes and uses." 1 in Mass. 460. "153 Mass. 258.