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273 NOTES. 273 ments still subsists. Then the case must be met where there is no condi- tion, merely a covenant. The shade of Dumpor's case is still powerful, and recently controlled the Court of Appeals of Maryland when the last- mentioned question was presented to it. Jiei/l v. IVeissner 6- Sons Brew- ing Co., 40 Atl. Rep. 877. The lessee there covenanted for himself not to assign the lease without consent ; there was no condition. He once assigned with the lessor's consent, and the court holds, upon the au- thority of Dumpor's case, that the lessor cannot complain when the assignee transfers his interest. True, the decision might have been put on the ground that the assignee, not being mentioned in the covenant, could not have been bound in any event ; but this ground is not noticed by the court. Yet the rule in Dumpor's case properly has no applica- tion to a covenant, and should not be extended by logic when it is not founded on any sound principle. Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486. Dum- por's case itself contained no covenant ; and in Brummel v. MacPherson, 14 Ves. Jr. 173, the English case which adopted the rule into the modern law, it was admitted in the argument that if the lease in question had contained a covenant, the covenant would have lived after the condition died. In America, too, what little authority there is tends generally in the same direction. Dakinw. Williams, 22 Wend. 201, 2 o; Gannett v. Albree, 103 Mass. 372. It is doubly unfortunate that the rule in Dum- por's case should be extended in the principal case when the decision might have been placed on other grounds, and when the application of the rule cannot be excused by the fact that it avoids a forfeiture. TuG-BOAT Marriages and the Lex Domicilii. — A scheme to avoid unpleasant marriage laws has gained some notoriety on the Pacific coast. Relying on the principle that the validity of the marriage is to be judged by the law of the place of its celebration, the parties sail outside the three- mile limit, are married by the skipper, and, according to their statement, return wedded by the law of the high seas. This device met a deserved fate at the hands of the Supreme Court of California when it came before them in the case of Norman v. Norman, 54 Pac. Rep. 143. The above formula had been gone through by two persons whose ages according to California law would have prevented their marriage without the consent of their parents. A week after their return the would-be wife tired of the marriage state and went home. Suit was thereupon brought to have the marriage affirmed. The court, however, granted the prayer of the defendant that the plaintiff be " precluded from ever setting up to be her husband." The decision is doubtless sound, but the reasoning is not quite satis- factory. The parties, say the court, went away simply to avoid compli- ance with the law of their domicile ; this marriage therefore will not be held valid unless contracted under some recognized law. No such law here existed, and the marriage was void. While there is little authority on the point, it seems nevertheless clear that cases may exist of marriages which are valid though celebrated under no recognized law. If parties are travelling abroad and under the local law they cannot validly marry, they may contract in the forms used in their domicile, and the marriage will there be recognized. Kentw. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361. Under such cir- cumstances it has been said that, if these forms could not be complied with, there might be a good marriage by mere consent of the parties.