Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/238

218 2l8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Home Rule, c. 7. The act in the principal case seems to have been such as to war- rant the decision, which is in accord with the trend of authority. Burrill v. City of Augusta, 78 Me. 118. Municipal Corporations — Public Necessity— Right to Compensation. — Village trustees burned a mill and destroyed a dam, to prevent a flood from damaging a highway and other property. Held, that the village is not bound to pay compensa- tion, since the act was justifiable on the ground of public necessity. Atken v. Village of Wells River, 40 Atl. Rep. 829 { Vt.). This case is in accord with authority, but it seems unfortunate in its result. Field V. The City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575. In times of public danger individual rights of property give way to the higher laws of impending necessity, and an owner has no claim for reimbursement for property destroyed at such a time in the interests of the public. This seems unjust ; the owner has been guilty of no legal wrong, and his property should not be confiscated. On principle, it would seem that, though the com- munity should be allowed to destroy private property at such a time, it should pay for the benefit it has received at the owner's expense. See 3 Harv. Law Rev. 189. Persons — Inf'ants — Compromise. — An infant, by his next friend, employed an attorney to bring an action. The latter compromised the suit, consenting to an entry of judgment and satisfaction on the record. Held, that the infant was bound by the acts of the attorney. Belivean v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 40 Atl. Rep. 735 (N, H.). The question considered is whether an infant should be bound by such a com- promise in a jurisdiction where an adult would be bound under similar circumstances. The court was unable to cite any decision directly in point, but has reached a very practical conclusion. The next friend is, in legal contemplation, an officer of the court appointed by it to act for the infant where he is under a legal disability Guild V. Cranston, 8 Cush. 506; Baltimore &" O. A'. B. Co. v. Fttzpatrick, 36 Ind. 6ig. An attorney appointed by the next friend is, therefore, an ordinary attorney of record, and there is no apparent reason why his acts in this capacity should not bind the infant, as fully as they would bind an adult by whom he had been appointed. Tillotson v. Hargrave, 3 Madd. 494; Tripp v. Giff'ord, 155 Mass. 108. Persons — Married Women — Separate Estate. — Held, that a married woman may charge her separate equitable estate for payment of a debt for which she is liable only as a surety. A^at'l Exchange Bank v. Cumberland Lumber Co., 47 S. W. Rep. 85 (Tenn., Sup. Ct.). The decision has the support of the great weight of authority. Schouler, Hus- band and Wife, §249. There seems to be no adequate reason why a married woman, who is allowed to bind her separate estate by contract, should not be permitted to do so in the capacity of a surety. Some courts, however, deny a married woman the right to bind her separate estate except by such contracts as are for the benefit of her estate, and hold that contracts of suretyship are not of that nature. Perkins v. Elliott, 27 N. J. Eq. 526. This construction is properly regarded in the principal case as too narrow to accord with the present position of married women in courts of e(|uity. Property — Conversion — Damages. — A innocently cut trees on land of plaintiff, manufactured them into lumber, and then sold it to defendant. In an action of trover, ''held, that the measure of damages is the value of the lumber at the time of the sale to defendant. IVing v. Milliken, 40 Atl. Rep. 138 (Me.). This case follows the general rule of damages in trover, that the value of the prop- erty be given at the time of the conversion by the party sued. Defendant's conversion was at the moment he bought the lumber. Where the original taking is innocent, however, the majority of the courts in this country would give only the value of the trees as standing timber. Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 176; Clark v. Holdridge, ^"^ N. Y. Sapp. 115; Heard v. fames, 49 Miss. 236. They apply the rule of Wood v. Moorewood, 3 Q. B. 440, where the plaintiff in an action for conversion of coal was allowed to recover only its value in the ground. The principal case seems to state the better rule. The owner should have the value of his property at the time the defendant deprives him of it, without regard to its previous history. It is urged in support of Woods. Moorewood, supra, that the plaintiff there received practically full compensation, as the value of coal is not likely to increase while it remains in the ground, and that plain- tiff should not receive more than he has lost. This argument, however, whatever its force in Wood v. Moorewood, supra, is not applicable to the principal case, as trees may become much more valuable if allowed to stand. Property — Easements — Covenants Running with the Land. — A owned two adjacent tracts of land, on one of which was a grain elevator and on the other a mill. A mill-race discharged water on a wheel connected with the mill machinery, Irom which power was transmitted to the elevator. A sold the elevator to the plain-