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217 RECENT CASES. 21/ The declaration was mere hearsay, and was clearly inadmissible. Gilleland v. SchuyUr, 9 Kail. 569; City of Beardstown v. City 0/ Virion nia, 76 111. 34. In England the declarations of a voter as to his disqualifications were first admitted by Parliament in contests over seats in that body, at a time when the privilege of voting depended upon the ownership of a freehold. Such declarations were held to be against the proprietary interest of the declarant, and hence within an exception to the rule against hearsay. This English rule has been adopted by Congress, although in this country declarations as to disqualifications cannot be against the proprietary interest of the declarant, since the right to vote does not depend upon a property qualifica- tion ; and as an extension of this rule the declarations of a voter as to how he voted are held admissible. McCrary, Elections, 4th ed., § 483 ei seq. There are a few judicial decisions which sanction the same practice. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309. They are not to be supported, however, as they violate the fundamental rule of evidence that mere hearsay is not admissible. Life Insurance — Assignment — Wagering Policy. — W. insured her life in favor of her executors, administrators, and assigns. She then assigned the policy, according to a prior agreement, in consideration that the assignee pay the premiums. The assignee had no insurable interest in the life of the insured. Held, that a legally entitled beneficiary may assign a life-insurance policy to one having no interest. But that the facts in this case showed the assignment to have been a colorable. one, the effect of the prior agreement being to make the assignee substantially the real appli- cant ; the policy was therefore a wagering one, and the assignee could not recover on it. Clement v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 46 S. W. Rep. 561 (Tenn., Sup. Ct.). This decision represents the prevailing view in this country, that the assignee of the beneficiary of a life-insurance policy need have no interest in the life insured. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24. It also seems a correct interpretation of the facts that such a policy as that in the principal case is a wagering one. An arrangement, the effect of which is to make the apparent applicant a mask for the really interested party, who stands no chance of loss beyond his premiums, clearly makes a policy a gambling transaction. Olmstead-v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593. Marine Insurance — Total Loss. — The ship " Blairmore," insured for ;^i5,ooo, sunk in San Francisco Harbor. The owners formally abandoned her as a total loss. Thereupon the insurers raised her at an expense of ^^9,500, and claimed that the loss was now only a partial one. The owners refused to accept the ship. Held, that by the principles of marine insurance such a sunken vessel is a total loss. The Blairmore Co. v. Macredie, [1898] App. Cas. 593. See Notes. Mortgages — Subrogation — Statute of Limitations. — The devisee of a mortgagor, by representing the estate to be solvent, induced plaintiff to take a deed of the mortgaged land, assuming the mortgage. Plaintiff later paid this to prevent fore- closure, and had it discharged. The estate proving insolvent, held, that plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to the mortgagee's lien, but that as against him the Statute of Limitations ran from the maturity of the mortgage note, not from the time the mortgage was discharged. Fullerton v. Bailey, 53 Pac. Rep. 1030 (Utah). The plaintiff's right to subrogation seems plain. Spaulding v. Harvey, 129 Ind. 106 ; Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. Rep. 756. But in Utah apparently a mortgage lien is gone when the note secured by it is barred. So the question arises whether plaintiff can recover if the statutory period has elapsed since the note became due, which was some years before plaintiff paid it. The answer depends upon whether plaintiff by subrogation obtained a new right or succeeded to an old one, like an assignee. On the analogy of suretyship, plaintiff having, in order to protect his own interests, relieved the estate from a debt, would have a new quasi-contractual right to reim- bursement from the estate. Scott v. Nichols, 61 Am. Dec. 503 and note. This, how- ever, would not do him full justice because of the estate's insolvency. The court should have carried the analogy one step further, and said that as plaintiff freed the land from a burden, the land must recompense him by a new lien in substitution for the old one. Municipal Corporations — Liability for Negligence of Servants. — Through the negligence of the driver, a sprinkling cart in the service of the defend- ant struck the plaintiff's buggy and injured the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant is not liable, as its servant was engaged in the discharge of a governmental duty of the defendant in promoting the public health. Connelly v. Mayor of Nashville, 46 S. W. Rep. 565 (Tenn., Sup. Ct..). It is well settled that a city is not liable for damage caused by acts performed in its govermental, as distinguished from its corporate, capacity. As to what acts should be considered governmental,- the authorities are not uniform. Goodnow, Municipal