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135 NOTES. 135 The decision of the Court s^ems correct. Granting that possession as agent is not possession as pledgor when the intrusting is temporary, the possessions seem exactly as distinct when the intrusting is permanent ; and there appears to be no way to distinguish the cases on principle. Story, Bailment, § 299; Jones, Pledge, §§ 40-44. The fact that there was no transfer of physical possession is immaterial ; for the possession of the pledge after giving the property to the agent is constructive, and a con- structive possession may clearly be raised by words alone. Examples of this are found in the cases under the Statute of Frauds, where an agree- ment by the seller to hold as agent for the buyer is held to constitute " actual receipt " by the buyer ; and the case of the warehouseman agree- ing to hold for a stranger instead of for the bailor. Again, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Macomber v. Parker, 14 Pick. 497, has held in a very able opinion that the owner of a brickyard can make a pledge of his bricks, valid as against his creditors, by agreeing to hold as agent for the pledgee, though no physical possession passes. These authorities, therefore, seem amply to justify the court in the principal case in the decision that there was a valid pledge without actual transfer of possession. The second point arose on the contention of the creditors that the de- fendant was estopped to deny the ownership of the bank. It does not appear, however, that the creditors even heard of the paper before the failure ; neither does it appear that they were influenced in the slightest degree by the fraud practised on the bank examiners. Therefore, as they never, to their detriment, acted on the implied representation that owner- ship was in the bank, the court was correct in holding that there was no ground for an estoppel. Great American Judges — Supreme Court of the United States. — • A far different country from the one which called Marshall to be Chief Justice was the one which called Taney to succeed Marshall, in 1836. And the man was different. Roger Brooke Taney was a native of Mary- land. His first school was a log cabin, but he eventually gained a second- rate college education. A year of fox-hunting followed, and then he settled down to the law. Taney was not physically strong; he showed muscular weakness, and, though tall, was inclined to stoop ; but under- neath was strong vitality and a firm will. A powerful sense of duty carried him through a laborious and useful life. His success at the bar was immediate ; yet he had his difficulties to meet. His timidity was painful, and was never wholly thrown aside. This forced him to discipline himself in a manner which perhaps led to the self-control which became a marked trait in him ; and although he was a man of strong feelings, he seldom betrayed them except in his voice and in his eyes. In politics Taney was originally a Federalist ; but upon the disintegration of parties after the war of 18 12 he became a supporter of Jackson. Against his own inclinations he accepted the position of attorney-general in Jackson's cabinet, and was a full believer in the President's measures. The contest with the National Bank followed. Taney was made secretary of the treasury, and removed the public de- posits from the bank, as Jackson wished. For this action he was much abused ; but sentiment changed sufficiently to permit his appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1836. His appointment was no error ; he was a great judge. The theory of the Con- 18