Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/131

111 MANDA TOR Y INJUNCTIONS. 1 1 1 his building as to leave the passageway unobstructed, and to pay the plaintiff the damages suffered pending the suit, on account of the encroachment " The defendant having by the service of proc- ess," said the court (Gray, Chief Justice), " full notice of the plaintiff's claim, went on to build at his own risk ; and the injury caused to the plaintiff's estate by the defendant's wrongful act being substantial, a court of equity will not allow the wrongdoer to compel innocent persons to sell their right at a valuation, but will compel him to restore the premises, as nearly as may be, to their original condition."^ I have already mentioned the case of Coe v. Louisville & Nash- ville R. R. Co.2 That case is typical of many others in which the mandatory injunction was the remedy applied to bring about the performance of duties or contracts by railroads and other common carriers, and to regulate matters relating to commerce. Many such cases are stated in the note to Moundsville v. Ohio River R. R. Co.^ In the Coe case the plaintiff had purchased a lot contig- uous to defendant's depot in Nashville, and fitted up a stock-yard thereon at considerable expense. There was no express contract between plaintiff and the railroad company in relation to the matter ; but the yard was and had been a convenience to the de- fendant's business, and by defendant's permission or acquiescence it was connected with the railroad by gaps and pens. After the yard had been used by both parties for more than twelve years, the defendant entered into a contract with the Union Stock Yard Company for the erection of a stock-yard outside the city limits, more than a mile distant from plaintiff's yard ; and among other things defendant agreed with this stock-yard company that it would deliver all stock shipped to Nashville at this new yard, and that it would not deliver it at any other point in the city. The railroad company accordingly notified the plaintiff that it would not deliver stock shipped to him at his yard after a specified date. Thereupon the plaintiff filed his bill in which he prayed for an injunction to restrain defendant from interfering with or in any manner disturb- ing the enjoyment of the facilities now afforded to complainant by defendant upon its lines of railway, for the transaction of business, and from refusing to deliver stock at plaintiff's yard, and from interfering with or in any way disturbing the business of plaintiff, 1 Tucker v. Howard (1880), 128 Mass. 361. 2 (1880) 3 Fed. Rep. 775. 8 (1892) 20 L. R. A. 161, 166. IS